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H. K. Hasegawa, N. J. Alvares, A. E. Lipska-Quinn 
D. G. Beason, K. L. Foote, and S. J Priante 
A3STRACT 
This report summarizes research conducted in fiscal ./ear 1381 for the 
DOE-supported project, "Fire Protection Research for Ener&y Technology 
Projects." Initiated in 1977, this ongoing research program was conceived to 
advance fire protection strategies for Energy Technology Projects to keep 
abreast of the unique fire problems that are developing with the complexity of 
energy technology research. 
We are developing an analytical methodology through detailed study of 
fusion energy experiments at Lawrence Livermore Natirnal Laboratoiy (LLNL). 
Employing these facilities as mou_ls for methodology development, we ate 
simultaneously advancing three major task areas: 
• Determination of unique fire hazards of current fusion energy 
facilities. 
» Evaluation of the ability of accepter" fire management measures to 
meet and negate hazards. 
4 Performance of unique research into problem areas we have identified 
to provide input into analytical fire-growth -~i damage-assessment models. 
INTRODUCTION 
This document accounts for work done in fiscal year 19B1 for a DOE-funded 
study entitled, "Fire Protection Research for Energy Technology Projects." 
Originally, the scope was limited to fusion energy research facilities, but it 
is now expanded to include other selected forms of energy research. As our 
study progressed we felt that logic and analytical methodologies developed for 
fusion facilities could be applied to a range of eme-ging and established 
energy technologies. 
Figure 1 is s general schematic of the overall logic of the- fire safety 
evaluation and Table 1 lists tasks we are advancing to achieve our major 
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goals. An ultimate output of this study is to assess potential fire damage in 
these facilities. To accomplish this, three parameters must be evaluated: 
(1) fire "Threat potential to the facility, (2) response and effectiveness of 
fire management systems, and (3) resultant fire-related damage. 
We continued to modify and refine room-filling models in our efforts to 
predict potential fire/smoke threat to these facilities. In FY'81 we 
conducted a series of semi-ideal forced ventilation enclosure fire tests 
designed to produce da;a to compare to analytical results from room-filling 
codes. We also performed a series of large-scale cable fires (prototype) and 
magnetic tape fires. Furthermore, we expanded our cable library by 20 generic 
types of insulation and continue the analysis of their thermal degradation 
kinetics. Chemical analysis of acid ion release mechanisms continues to 
progress. Since our findings indicate that extensive damage to sensitive 
electronics and optics can be caused by corrosive combustion products, even 
from small fires that do not create substantial thermal hazards, this portion 
of the research is of primary importance. 
Parameters evaluations of detection and suppression hardware were 
conducted to establish the commercial state-of-the-art, &nd we made studies of 
unique components of generic polymers to use as specific tracers for fire 
source and location detection. The first mailing of the off-site survey 
questionnaires was returned and evaluated during this period. Discussion and 
analysis of these materials reveal that the survey format and content raised 
more questions than it provided insight to off-site fire management procedures. 
History and background for this report are contained in previous 
... .. 1,2,3 publications. 
Our accomplishments for fiscal year 1S81 are listed below. Specific 
topics are described in detail in the text of the report. 
CHEMISTRY 
• LLNL electrical cable scock delineation and reduction to 20 generic 
types of insulation. 
• Thermogravimetric and differential scanning analyses of generic 
cable insulation types and identification of similarities and differences. 
• Comparison of thermal properties of cable insulation types with pure 
polymer (neoprene and PVC) to identify effects of plasticizers and additives. 
• Chemical analysis of acid ion release mechanisms. 
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• Comparison of kinetics of thermal degradation of cable insulation 
types with pure polymer (neorrene and PVC) to identify effects of plasticizers 
and additives. 
PHYSICAL SMOKE 
• Established calibration procedure for aerosols used in dilution 
studies. 
• Adapted parous tube sampling probe to produce aerosol dilution 
without changing aerosol distribution. 
LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENTS AND MODELING 
• Magnetic tape fire experiments. 
• Fire tests for model studies. 
• Model-fire test correlation studies. 
• Developed and tested algorithms for correlation studies. 
• Preliminary large-scale cable experiments. 
EXTINGUISHANT STUDIES 
• AFFF application to gasohol fires. 
• Effectiveness of gaseous extinguishants on magnetic tape fires. 
DETECTOR STUDIES 
• Statp-of-the-art survey of the operation and reliability of early 
warning detection systems. 
FIRE RISK ANALYSIS 
• Preliminary application of risk assessment protocol to a LLNL fusion 
facility. 
• First mailing and evaluation of the off-site fire management system 
questionnaires. 
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This report is structured so that progress in the abo-. i listed items will 
be described in major sections as listed below: 
(1) Large-scale Experiments 
• Magnetic tape studies 
(a) Analysis for acid ion (see Ref. 4) 
(b) Portable extinguishers 
(c) Total-flooding extinguishant 
• Prototype large-scale cable burns 
(2) Off-Site Questionnaires Review 
(3) Fire Risk Analysis (see Appendix A) 
(4) Fire Modeling (see Appendices B and C) 
(?) Fire Chemistry 
• Detailed thermal degradation of polymeric electrical insulations 
(6) Physical Smoke Studies (see Appendix D) 
(7) Smoke Detector Survey (see Appendix D) 
(8) Conclusions and Future Work 
A major advancement in FY'31 was the performance of a number of large-
scale fire experiments which are presented in the first section. 
MAGNFTIC TAPE FIRE EXPERIMENTS 
The following study was pursued in two parts. The research presented 
below was the second phase dualing with magnetic tape fire dynamics and the 
effectiveness of extinguishants. Initially, a short experimental series was 
completed to evaluate the corrosive effects of the combustion gases, the 
results of which were presented in Reference 4. 
Potential high-loss areas in energy technology projects include 
experiment control rooms and computer facilities. In this case, high loss is 
a combination of expensive computational and diagnostic electronics alcng with 
sizeable "down time" for the facility resulting i.i lost research time. The 
majority of these areas, especially computer centers, house great numbers of 
magnetic tape reels commonly encased in polymeric covers of ABS or 
polypropylenes. Furthermore, normal storage protocol is to stand or hang 
tapes vertically with a uniform space between each. In terms of fire spread, 
this configuration combines maximum surface-to-volume ratios with near optimal 
air entrainment resulting in very fast fire spread if a fire were to occur. 
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Both particulate and corrosive components of the combustion gases from a 
moderate fire would have damaging effects on electronic equipment. This would 
also be true of portable extinguishers which discharge a particulate 
extinguishant on fires; e.g., dry chemical. Since tape storage normally 
.shares the same space with computers or spaces which communicate with computer 
rooms, without timely and effective extinguishment sensitive computational and 
diagnostic electronics could suffer major smoke and fire damage. 
Due to the above reasons, we conducted a research program to evaluate the 
fire potential of tape reels and the effectiveness of appropriate counter-
We investigated and evaluated the fire suppression effectiveness of: 
7.7-kg (17-lb) Halon 1211 portable extinguisher. 
2.25-kg (5-lb) Halon 1211 portable extinguisher. 
6.8-kg (15-lb) carbon dioxide (CO ) portable fire extinguisher. 
Fixed wet pipe sprinkler. 
Halon 12(11 total flooding system. 
Following a visua.'. survey of various types of tapp storage racks used at 
LLNL, we fabricated the unit shown in Pig. 2. Due to the following design 
features, we felt that this configuration would enhance the growth rate and 
severity of the fire: 
• It is a free-standing open rack which allows maximum air entrainment 
to all tape reel surfaces. 
• The rack provides positive support to hold the tapes upright 
throughout the burn with a uniform space between each which ensures that they 
remain in place and burn with maximum surface-to-volume ratios. • 
This three-level rack, containing nine tapes per shelf, was used 
throughout the series. Each test was initiated with a low bunsen burner flame 
and was allowed to develop to one of two stages: (1) a low-level fire, defined 
as fire involvement of the tapes on the lowest shelf and partial involvement 
of those on the second shelf, or (2) a high-intensity fire, defined as the 
full involvement of all three shelves. 
In our efforts to reproduce these two fire conditions, we supplemented 
our visual judgement of fire size by monitoring temperatures at each level on 
the rack. Reproducibility of the two fire intensities from test to test was 
imperative to conduct a proper comparison of the various modes of 
extinguishment (i.e., the respective agents had to be applied to as near to 
the same fire conditions as possible.) 
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PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER EXPERIMENTS 
For the portable extinguishers (CO, and Halon 1211) the research plan 
was to test their effectiveness on the low-intensity fire and, if successful, 
repeat the experiments with the high-intensity fire. However, the first 
experiment in the series was to determine the time-dependent processes 
occurring during the development of a deep-seated, fully involved fire and to 
monitor the following: 
• The time at which a 165°P fusible link sprinkler, mounted directly 
above the fire, would activate and its effectiveness in knocking down the fire. 
• The length of time for an ionization-type smoke detector located in 
a remote corner of the test cell ceiling to activate. 
• Temperatures at different levels on the rack. 
• Dynamic mass-loss tate of fire. 
• Fire development diagnostics. 
This first experiment served as a baseline fire exposure which enabled us 
to define the levels of low- and high-intensity fires. After reviewing 
videotapes cT magnetic tape burns we had performed previously, we decided that 
the bunsen burner was an appropriate ignition source for this application. 
The low intensity of the burner produced a very slow initial fire development 
which enabled us to pick a number of points ?.n time to apply exfcinguishant for 
the low-intensity fire. 
Figure 3 is a photo of the experimental set-up with the location of the 
sprinkler head and smoke detector. Both devices were approximately 2.1 m -
2.4 m (7-8 ft) above the top of the rack. 
Pertinent observations for this experiment were the following: 
• The gas to bunsen burner turned on to preset leve"1 and ignited at t . 
• The gas to burner shut off at t + 210 s. 
• The smoke detector sounded at t + 223 s. 
o 
• The sprinkler head fused and discharged water at t + 402 s. 
As can be seen from the temperature plots of the middle and top racks 
(Fig. 4), the fire was deep-seated when »:he sprinkler discharged. The single 
sprinkler bead at a flowrate of 136 1/min (36 gpm) at 496 kPa (72 psig) 
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produced a coverage of about 23 1/min/m (.57 gpm/ft ) which did not 
extinguish the fire. Although the sprinkler's response time was minimized by 
positioning it directly over the fire, its effectiveness was reduced due to 
the sparseness of droplets in the center of the .spray pattern (Fig. 5 shows 
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the air temperature next to the sprinkler head). Furthermore, because it was 
a three-tier rack, water penetration to the middle and bottom levels would be 
difficult. Fig. 6 is a photo of the fully developed fire and Fig. 7 shows the 
post-test remains. The total mass loss for the burn was a little less than 
2 kg which is not a lot of fuel relative to the size of the resultant fire. 
From the video records and temperature plots of this initial fire, we 
picked a low, medium, and high fire intensity. We then reproduced these 
levels and tested the effectiveness of the portable extinguishers on them. 
The second experiment involved a 6.8-kg (15-lb) CO extinguisher on the 
low intensity fire. in this test the burner was turned off at t + 120 s 
and the CO, was applied at 263 s. The extinguisher had no problem knocking 
down the fire in approximately 2 s. 
The third experiment tested the effectiveness of a 6.8-kg CO on a 
medium-intensity fire. In this case the burner was turned off at 
approximately 150 s and the CC applied at 280 s. For this fire the 
extinguisher nozzle had to be positioned very close t* the flames, about 15.2 
cm (6 in.), and CO discherqed for 10 s before the fire was put out. The 
CO was nearly depleted at extinguishment. 
We decided to skip the low-intensity fire and test the 7.7-kg (17-lb) 
Halon 1211 directly on the high-intensity fire. The bunsen burner was shut 
off at approximately t + 90 s, and the fire was fully involved and deep-
seated at 315 s (see Fig. 8 temperature plot). Halon 1211 was applied at 375 s 
at an approximate distance of 6 ft which knocked the fire down completely in 
around 4 s, using only 2.73 kg (6 lb) of Halon. 
This experiment was so successful that we wanted to evaluate the effect 
of extinguisher size and tried a 2.25-kg (5-lb) 1211 unit on the fully 
involved fire—it did not terminate the fire. Even though it was only .45 kg 
(1 lb) less than that used by the 7.7-kg size, apparently the rate of 
application due to residual Halon and pressure was the margin that affected 
extinguishment. Consequently, the 2.25-kg unit didn't have sufficient backup 
"punch" to tackle a fire of this magnitude. 
This experimental se-ies dramatically illustrated that the 7.7-kg Halon 
1211 extinguisher was far superior to CO and, possibly, sprinkler water 
spray for this application. The fact that 1211 starts out in liquid form, 
then vaporizes when it hits tie fire, allows the user to effectively apply 
Halon from a safe distance. 
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TOTAL-FLOODING HALON 1301 EXPERIMENTS 
To complete this experimental series we also conducted two large-scale 
magnetic tape burns to evaluate the effectiveness of a fixed, total-flooding 
Haloii 1301 system. As in the previous series, we used two different fire 
intensities: 
(1) An incipient fire with Halon discharged shortly after the firing of 
two cross-zone smoke detectors. 
(2) A deep-seated fire of approximately the same intensity as the deep-
seated fires in the portable tire extinguisher experiments. 
Unfortunately, we had only a limited quantity of Halon 1301—two spheres 
containing 6.8 kg (15 lb) each (see Fig. 9 ) . Our calculations showed that a 
volume of approximately 14.15 m (500 ft ) would retain a Halon 
concentration of 5% to 6% for the amount of extinguishant in each sphere. 
Therefore, we constructed the 2.4 m x 2.4 m x 2.4 m (8 ft x 8 ft x 8 ft) high 
compartment shown in Fig. : 0 . The .91 m x .61 m (3 ft -, 2 ft) opening in the 
ceiling was added in an attempt to aid visual observations by venting a 
portion of the smoke. Our calculations for Halon concentration included the 
leakage through this hole which had only a negligible effect on the 
concentration. 
The experimental configuration and location of instrumentation are shown 
in Fig. 11. In addition. Figs. 12, 13, and 14 show the tape rack set-up, 
location and configuration of Halon nozzle, and view through compartment dcoi, 
respectively. As in the previous burns, a bunsen burner was used as the 
ignition source as shown in F.lg. 15. In conjunction with evaluating the 
effectiveness of 1301, we also wanted to determine the effect of the 
decomposed extinguishant on the programming recorded on tapes which were not 
directly involved in the fire. Four pre-programmed tapes were placed on a 
rack in a remote corner of the compartment and shielded from the radiant 
component of the fire by a piece of gypsum wallboard as shown in Fig. 16. To 
insure that these tapes did not experience excessive air temperatures, we 
installed a thermocouple in this area. 
In total, the following conditions were monitored during the experiments; 
(a) Temperatures. 
• At the various locations in the compartment. 
• The four levels of the tape rack. 
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• In the remote corner near the pre-programmed tapes, 
• In the ignition flame. 
(b) Oxygen concentration. 
(c) Halon 1301 concentration at several locations in the compartment. 
(d) Heat fluxes from the burning computer tapes. 
(e) A pressure transducer tied into the Halon discharge line to 
determine the exact duration of gaseous release (see Fig. 9 ) . 
The two detectors attached to the ceiling, shown in Fig. 17, were typical 
ionization-type used here at LLNL. Each was wired into its own zone as 
indicated by a standard Zone Indicating Unit (ZIU) and powered by a Fire 
Indicating L'nit (FIU). Since the detectors were wired into separate zones 
they are refer.ed to as "cross-zoned." Typically, 1301 systems under computer 
room floors will not discharge unless detectors from two different zones fire 
to avoid costly discharges due to false alarms. We wanted to duplicate this 
situation for the first experiment, which would also mean that the fire would 
be in its incipient stage, thereby testing the effectiveness of Halon on a 
low-intensity fire. As mentioned previously, the fully involved, deep-seated 
fire would be very near Che same fire used in the portable extinguisher fires. 
The following is a summary of the results for the two experiments. 
Test #1. Halon 1301 discharged 20 s after the firing of the two cross-zoned 
smoke detectors. 
(a) Ignition of bunsen burner: 0 s. 
(b) First detector fires and ignition of first level of tapes on rack: 
+45 s. 
(c) Second detector fires and ignition of second level: +120 s. 
(d) Halon 1301 manually discharged: +140 s. 
Results. Total discharge time of gas was 3 s. There was an immediate 
knockdown of the fire with an average Halon concentration of 5%. 
Test #2. Halon discharged after the fire had become deep-seated. 
(a) Ignition of bunsen burner: 0 s. 
(b) Ignition of first rack: +30 s. 
(c) First detector fires: +70 s. 
(d) Second detector fires: +100 s. 
(e) Ignition of the second level on the rack: +150 s. 
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(f) Burner shut off: +180 s. 
(g) Ignition of third level on the rack: +205 s. 
(h) Fire fully involved: +300 s. 
(i) Halon discharged: +325 s. 
Results. Discharge duration 3.75 s. Average Halon 1301 concentration 5%. 
The fire was knocked down immediately with the exception of slight, residual 
smoldering in the bottom level of the rack for about 15 min. 
Discussion 
After studying the videotape records and the time/temperature plots for 
the various rack levels (see Fig. 18), it can be seen that both fires had 
similar growth histories up until the point where the first fire was 
extinguished. 
In both experiments the pre-programmed tapes in the remote corner were 
unaffected by the 1301 and retained their programming. This result is more 
significant for the deepseated fire, since it was longer in duration and, 
consequently, more intense. From the time/temperature plots in Fig. 18, it is 
more than likely that the 1301 decomposed in Test #2 which would mean the 
generation of hydrogen bromide. Literature states that Halon 1301 begins 
to decompose above 485°C (~900°F) and the bottom level of the tape rack had 
achieved this temperature. It should also be noted that in the second run the 
=*ir temperature around the pre-programmed tapes peaked at 60°C at 
extinguishment. Figs. 19 and 20 show the condition of the tapes after 
experiment #1 and #2 respectively. The difference in fire intensities is 
obvious in the two photos; experiment #1 shows very minor damage compared to 
the second run which illustrates almost total destruction. 
Detector response for both devices was fairly rapid (120 and 100 s for 
the second detector) in these experiments. However, in both cases, it was the 
detector closest to the fire which was the last to key. This firing of the 
second detector was delayed because it was located too close to the corner in 
the compartment in addition to being in the direct path of the inlet air flow. 
Nevertheless, both fires were extinguished immediately and effectively by 
the 1301, which is surprising for the deepseated fire because the Halon 
concentration was only at 5% and had a very short soak time (10-45 s depending 
on location in the compartment for both tests). 
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To ensure that the fire was not oxygen-limited at the time of extinguish­
ment we monitored the 0„ concentration during the experiments. It can be 
seen in Fig. 21 that in neither instance did the 0 drop below 20% before 
the extinguishant was expelled into the compartment, which is indicated by the 
drop at 215 s and 315 s respectively. These data show that the knockdown of 
the fire was not aided by the "smothering" effects of combustion gases. 
Finally, Figs. 22 and 23 are composite plots of temperatures at various 
locations in the compartment, showing relatively low air temperatures for both 
tests. Similarly, heat fluxes were very low. 
Conclusions 
Even though just two experiments were conducted in this series, the 
results were encouraging. Firstly, the calculations for Halon concentration 
gave an accurate prediction for the actual concentration in the compartment. 
Secondly, recommendations from Halon design manuals normally suggest a much 
higher concentration (>10%) and long soak times for "deepseated" fires. 
However, it may be argued that even a well-developed magnetic tape fire does 
not fit the classic definition of a deepseated fire. In any case, Halon 1301 
concentrations above 7-8% are not recommended for spaces occupied by humans. 
Since most computer and control room facilities have personnel adjacent to or 
within tape storage areas, 1301 normally would not be recommended above the 
floor. This experimental series was not extensive enough to make any definite 
statements about lowering concentration and soak time requirements for these 
fires. Furthermore, other contents in these areas would have to be taken into 
account (i.e., computer printout, combustible furnishings, etc.) for the 
appropriateness of extinguishant. Nevertheless, a modest amount of further 
research in this area could prove to be valuable in the protection of tape 
storage facilities. 
PROTOTYPE LARGE-SCALE CABLE FIRE EXPERIMENTS 
In an effort to obtain design insights for a final experimental 
configuration, we performed a number of very crude exploratory large-scale 
vertical cable burns. 
Fire performance properties that we eventually hope to evaluate with the 
final apparatus include, but are not limited to: 
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Time to ignition. 
Mass-loss rate. 
Plamespread rate and extent. 
Mass balance; quantity of smoke in proportion to mass burning rate. 
Combustion-gas composition and rate of acid/ion generation. 
0 , C0 r CO,, and hydrocarbon concentrations. 
Temperatures— 
1. Profile through cross-section of array as well as along cable. 
2. Throughout test cell. 
3. At combustion-gas sampling ports. 
4. Air inlet and outlet. 
5. Ignition source flame. 
• Input and output heat fluxes. 
The prototype set-up shown in Fig. 24 includes; 
• A 30 cm (12 in.) by .91 m (3 ft) high pipe to maximize the 
re-radiative effects of the fire. 
• A 30 cm (12 in.) diameter methane/air premixed gravel burner 
ignition source. 
• A vent hood above the apparatus to create a vertical draft past the 
cable and to exhaust combustion products. 
EXPERIMENTS 
Four monitored burns were conducted in this apparatus. The first two 
tests utilized (1) a rubber-jacketed multi-conductor cable and (2) a rubber-
jacketed stranded copper cable. Both cables were around 1.6 cm (5/8 in.) in 
diameter and cut to 1.5-1.8 m (5-6 ft) lengths and were threaded into an 
expanded metal grate (as shown in Fig. 25) which was clamped to the top of the 
pipe. This grate held the 20-30 cable lengths in a vertical orientation and 
kept a uniform space between them which also helped duplicate the set-up from 
test to test. 
The second two experiments tested a 2.54-cm (1-in.) and a 1.04-cm 
(.41-in.) diameter polyvinyl chloride (PVC) jacketed co-axial cable. Fig. 26 
shows the cross-sectional composition of both these cables which contain a 
large percentage of polyethylene dielectric. Both of these cable sizes were 
previously tested in the SRI International htat-ielease-rate calorimeter along 
with a neoprene welding cable (also in Fig. 26). The results of that 
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experimental series indicated that an input irradiance of approximately 5 W/cm 
was a threshold flux for sustained burning and a rapid increase in heat-
release rate of the cables. 
Therefore, the gravel burner was calibrated to expose the horizontal 
2 portion of the cable to an irradiance of 5 W/cm at a distance of about 
15.3 cm (6 in.). The burner was fueled by a premixture of air and natural gas 
which produced a heat-release rate of 18.33 kj/s at a methane flowrate of 
0.5 1/s. 
Temperatures within the pipe were monitored at four equidistant levels 
and in the exhaust duct. For visual observation of vertical flamespread, four 
5-cm (2-in.) diameter holes were drilled about 18 cm (7 in.) apart. Our 
experimental protocol was to start the ventilation through the exhaust hood 
(causing a vertical draft past the cables) , ignite the burner .ind continue 
this ignition fire until the cables exhibited sustained burning, 
RESULTS FOR RUBBER-JACKETED CABLES 
As mentioned previously, the first two experiments were both rubber-
jacketed cables, one containing multi-conductors and the other containing 
stranded copper conductor. The pertinent observations for both experiments 
are listed below. 
Time (s) 
Multi-Conductor Stranded Copper 
Ventilation started 
and burner ignited 
Sustained ignition 
of horizontal section 
of the cable and burner 
shutoff 
Vertical flamespread 
17.78 cm (7 in.) 
35.6 cm (14 in.) 
53.3 cm (21 in.) 
71.1 cm (28 in.) 












Figures 27 and 28 which are composite plots of the temperatures recorded 
at four levels within the pipe substantiate the visual observations of 
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flamespread. There was a close similarity in the time/temperature histories 
between the two tests. Since both cables had the same jacket material and 
were of the same diameter, this similarity is not surprising, not to mention 
that flamespread rate is primarily a surface phenomenon after ignition. These 
points were substantiated from post-test weighings and examinations that 
indicated that very little of the rubber jacketing had actually burned off and 
the majority of damage was limited to the surface of the jacketing. A 
photograph of typical fire damage ir included as Fig. 29, and Fig. 30 shows a 
test in progress. 
RESULTS FOR PVC-JACKETED CABLES 
The third and fourth burns tested two different size co-axial cables; RG 
220 A/U and RG 11 A/U which are 2.54 cm (1 in.) and 1.04 cm (.41 in.) in 
diameter respectively. As shown previously in Fig. 26 they are of identical 
composition but the RG 11 A/U is about half the diameter of the larger cable. 
In terms of fire response, a significant characteristic of this cable is the 
large percentage of polyethylene dielectric. 
The experimental protocol was identical to the previous burns and the 
results are presented below. 
The third experiment was a test of the larger RG 220 A/U cable. As may 
be seen from the time-temperature plots (Fig. 31) we could not get the cable 
to ignite with this fire exposure and set-up, even after eleven minutes of 
constant fire exposure. 
However, the test of the RG 11 A/U had a different outcome. The 
pertinent observations are listed below. 
Time (s) 
Ventilation started and burner ignited 0 
Sustained ignition of horizontal section c 125 













The temperature rise shown in Fig. 32 demonstrates ignition and flame-
spread on the cables. The primary difference between the previous burn and 
this one is the size and mass of the two cable types. The RG 220 A/0 has 
approximately 7 times the mass of the 11 A/U which makes the former much more 
resistant to ignition from this fire exposure. It ^s very resistant to 
ignition in the tight bundle configuration used in this experimental series. 
This finding is no surprise, but it is one of the fire performance 
characteristics that we will be evaluating in the final experimental apparatus. 
Comparison of the temperature plots shows that the above three tests have 
very similar histories once self-sustained ignition has been established 
U.e., once a drastic change in slope begins). It appears that this 
similaricy is c-.used by the pipe enclosure, which means that it is doubtful 
this apparatus would produce enough resolution to adequately evaluate 
different cable types. 
However, we have gained enough insight from these preliminary burns to 
begin designing the formal experimental apparatus in the next fiscal year. 
OFF-SITE QUESTIONNAIRE REVIEW 
During the previous fiscal year our efforts included structuring and dis­
tributing sample questionnaires to fire protection professionals with respon­
sibility for fire prevention and fighting at each DOE experimental fusion 
facility. Besides those specific facilities, other experimental facilities 
involved in "nuclear technology" were aiso queried. Responses from these 
sources were received and provided additional response information. Within 
the mainline DOE fusion experiment alternatives, both ICF and HFE experiments 
were queried and responses were obtained. Our effort this year consisted of 
receiving ;nd reviewing these questionnaires and optimizing the structure -.nd 
content to facilitate information content and transfer. The following 
paragraphs describe our response to the completed questionnaires and some 
suggestions for improvements. 
First, through our review it became apparent that our original general 
questionnaire needs to be shortened and focused. One approach to shortening 
this general questionnaire can be accomplished by requesting that respondents 
provide building fire protection system blueprints for detection and 
suppression subsystems, thereby conveying the general building system 
structure. Alternatively, a generalized input/output diagram showing building 
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fire protection subsystems and their interconnections can be provided. The 
benefit provided by this option is threefold: 
• Brevity. 
• Uniformity of subject focus. 
• Uniformity of response. 
Second, throughout the review of sample questionnaire responses, it was 
apparent that respondents were not attributing any strategic emphasis from 
location to location within the experimental facility. As a result, specific 
questions regarding operational experiment availability and fire protection 
could not be addressed for lack of information. An approach to this concern 
would be to provide a request that fusion experiment staff identify specific 
pieces of equipment or subsystems whose loss or daiu^e would result in 
excessive program delay or in excessive additional operational funding. With 
this information questions involving localized fire protection system behavior 
could be solicited from the responsible fire protection professional. The 
usage of the same input/output or stimulus/response building fire protection 
system diagram could be used to describe strategically critical fusion 
equipment and its building compartments. To further describe critical 
compartments, a request for photographs would also assist us in determining 
pertinent fire protection equipment and local fuel loading. 
DETAILED FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT OF THE SHIVA EXPERIMENT 
(PRELIMINARY) 
In FY '81 our system tafety consultant from Econ, Inc., performed a 
preliminary detailed fire risk analysis of the Shiva fusion facility. A draft 
report describing the analysis is attached as Appendix A. The steps followed 
in an attempt to provide a consistent basis for evaluating various levels of 
fusion-experiment fire protection are listed briefly on the next page. 
The first major step in this assessment was to identify "critical" spaces 
and areas in the Shiva experiment. These spaces were identified by the Fire 
Science Group based on our perception of the importance of each area due to 
the economic value of its contents and its importance to the uninterrupted 
performance of fusion research. 
Appendix A goes beyond this last step to identify equipment and hardware 
essential to Shiva system availability. Our consultant from Econ, Inc. went 
through this identification process by interviewing key programmatic and 
operational personnel and arriving at consensus opinions on what items we te 
essential to Shiva system availability. 
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GENERAL FLOW OF SYSTEMS APPROACH TO FIRE RISK 
1 
DIVIDE 8LDG. INTO ZONES 
CRITERIA: 
A. May Use Fire Protection Zones. 
B. Natural Building Boundaries (Walls and Rooms) . 
2 
SELECT CRITICAL AREAS FOR ANALYSIS 
CRITERIA: 
A. Capital Loss. 
B. Programmatic Delay. 
3 
PERFORM ANALYSES TO DETERMINE FIRE HAZARD AND ZONE 
CRITERIA: 
A. Fire Growth Analysis. 
B. Fire Protection System Analysis. 
C. Research into Identified Problem Areas. 
4 
ASSESS POTENTIAL LOSS IN EACH CRITICAL ZONE 
CRITERIA: 
A. Programmatic Delay. 
B. Capital Loss. 
5 
ASSESS EXPT. FIRE IMPACT ACCEPTABILITY AND COMPARE EACH ZONE 
CRITERIA: 
A. LLNL Guidelines. 
B. DOE Guidelines. 
C. Programmatic Delay. 
6 
IDENTIFY COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO INCREASE FIRE SAFETY OF FACILITY 
CRITERIA: 
A. Reiterate Loss Assessment With Recommended Changes. 
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FIRE MODELING 
INTRODUCTION OF TEST SERIES 
One goal of this project is to produce or adopt analytical procedures for 
predicting growth rate of fires leading to corresponding thermal and smoke 
exposure to components and structures in large experimental facilities. In FY 
1980 we employed Cal-Tech's room-filling model to estimate temperature 
rise, and particulate concentration and interfacial boundary of the ceiling 
layer, from a set of ideal steady-state fires of prescribed strength contained 
in various fusion energy experiment and support enclosures. Plausible 
analytical results were obtained relative to specified assumptions 
(instantaneous fires at specified strength, specified fire location, realistic 
room air leak, no heat sinks, and specified source aerosol concentration in 
combustion products). However, we had no means of testing these results to 
determine their proximity to conditions in real fires of similar 
characteristics (i.e., fires on high-volatility liquid fuel spills, high-
pressure fuel sprays, or low-pressure gas leaks). Moreover, other national 
laboratories were very interested in developing fire-source-intensity terms 
for a variety of purposes. Their concern, like ours, was the lack of 
validation data for model correlation. A joint venture was presented* to 
conduct a set of ideal enclosure fire experiments at the LLNL fire test 
facility for the expressed purpose of developing calibration data for fire 
models. 
The proposed test series conditions were distributed to as many enclosure 
fire modelers as we could so that they could cast predictions of enclosure 
fire conditions prior to the tests. Time constraints, however were such that 
only cal-Tech, Los Alamos, and LLNL attempted pre-test estimates of enclosure 
fire conditions. 
* Principal players in this activity were: LLNL—Fire Science Group, Los 
Alamos—Safety Assessment Fluid and Thermal Section Q6, Hanford Engineering 
Development Laboratory, Cal-Tech—Dept. of Engineering and Applied Sciences, 
University of California Berkeley—Department of Mechanical Engineering. 
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
These tests were done in the enclosure shown schematically in Fig. 33. 
This t^st cell is ventilated by a negative-pressure system similar to HVAC 
circuits used in laboratories where containment of toxic materials is an 
issue. This system employs a centrifugal blower downstream of the test 
enclosure. Volumetric flow rate is measured by sharp-edge orifice at an 
appropriate distance upstream from the blower where the distance between sharp-
edqe orifice and test cell is large and potential temperature rise is low when 
fire experiments are performed. 
Our philosophy in conducting these tests was to have uncomplicated fire 
and ventilation conditions covered by extensive—as complete as possible— 
measurements. Thus fuel geometry was simple; a small-cross-section natural-
gas burner, or a heated .91-m (3-ft) diameter metal pan into which propyl 
alcohol or methyl alcohol was sprayed at calibrated rates to simulate 
conditions of pool fires. Source fires are looted in the absolute center of 
the enclosure. Ventilation air is admitted by two 30.5-cm (12-in.) diameter 
ducts lying along the wall/floor interface of each long test cell wall. Side 
holes in each duct distribute opposed flow air to test cell bottom. 
Figures 34 and 35 schematically show pertinent dimensions of the test cell and 
spatial relationships of internal components. 
Measured parameters are listed in Table 2 along with design fire strength 
and ventilation variations. Data derived from our measurements will define 
the response variables that we hoped to predict from our participating 
models. These "comparative parameters" are also listed last in Table 2. 
Figure 36 is a collage of four photographic views of test cell components and 
sensors: Plate "a" shows vertical thermocouple rake (A = 45 cm)* thermal 
radiation shield at foreground and visual reference board across the enclosure 
used for estimating descent of smoke level. Plate "b* is a direct view of the 
thermal radiation shield in center photograph including door side air inlet to 
left and raJiometer station on floor right. Close-up of radiometer station is 
shown on Plate "c". Plate "d" shows test cell north side air inlet anemometer. 
The visible duct is attached to a sheet metal box that plugs into the test 
cell wall (box barely visible in back corner of photographed enclosure). 
* A is distance between thermocouple stations along the rake. 
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Designed conditions of fire strength and ventilation rate were controlled 
by fuel-metering procedures and by balancing of inlet and outlet flow circuits 
respectively. Calibration of rotameters for liquid fuels (methyl and propyl 
alcohol) was done by direct volumetric procedures where fluids were decanted 
through metering circuits into a calibration volume. Liquid propulsion was 
provided by pressurizing fuel in a certified container, with nitrogen gas, 
where volumetric flow rate was controlled by metering valve. When methane was 
employed for low-intensity fires, a gas rotameter calibrated for air was used 
by applying conversion factors for body and rotameter float assembly. We were 
not certain of correct designation for these parts but because of urgency, we 
opted to proceed with this approximate calibration with the intent of having 
absolute calibration performed post-test. 
variation in fan speed is used to provide two different ventilation rates 
through the tesL cell. Fan location is 15.25 m (50 ft) from exit to test 
cell. At this distance, exhaust gases are substantially cooled so that sharp-
edge orifice measurements and fan characteristics are minimally effected. 
Temperature measurements taken at this station are applied to correct measured 
flow rate figures. Table 3 lists instrumentation type, calibration, and 
precision of devices used for sensing parameters of test cell fires and 
associated ventilation flow characteristics. 
Because we used essentially non-smoky fuels we were able to view most 
fires throughout the term of specific experiments. Both video and 
photographic records were collected. Examples of these fires are shown in 
Fig. 37. Plates "a" through "d" show respectively: methane at nominally 50 kW, 
methyl alcohol at nominally 400 kw, and propyl alcohol at nominally 400 kw and 
800 kW. Note that sprayed fuel is confined to ,92-m (3 ft) pan dimensions by 
a radial spray nozzle. Spraying rate dictates fuel consumed which in turn 
controls heat-release rate. Thus, with a simple fuel we can duplicate 
enthalpy production properties of a variety of fuels of differing energy 
potential. Both methane (CH„) and propyl alcohol (CH„CH_CH„OH) flames 
4 3 2 2 
have characteristic appearance of natural convection flames where color is 
mainly a phenomenon of incandescent soot particles resulting from production 
of longer-chain combustion product fragments heated in reaction regions. 
Methyl alcohol (CH OH) flames have a light violet hue which may be simply 
chemiluminescence of CH,OH oxidation. 
Figure 38 is a fire portrait of a 400 kW fire ventilated at 500 1/s. 
Inlet air flow, introduced at the bottom and on both sides of the test cell, 
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is recorded on channels 53 and 54. Exit air flow is recorded by channel 52. 
Since exit ?ir flow measurement is taken closest to the pump, we designate it 
as forced flow, therefore exit flow measurements are given a negative sign. 
Conversely, inlet flow essentially motivated by pressure differential between 
the outside and interior of the cell is given a positive sign and designated 
as "free" ventilation. The characteristic pattern for air flow in enclosure 
fires where air is supplied at an initially defined rate is duplicated in the 
figure. Initial prefire data (at 10 s) shows in^et air (+) to be of slightly 
greater magnitude than out flow (-), hence net air flow is slightly positive, 
indicating minor leak paths. When the fire is dynamically growing (about 
60 s), + flow is grossly curtailed because of gas expansion due to rapid 
temperature rise within the cell and in these data, net air flow is nearly 
zero. In 2 to 3 minutes, conditions in the test cell achieve a semi-
equilibrium state, where again the net air flow is nearly balanced. 
Table 4* shows air flow balance data for 200-, 400-, and 800-kW propyl 
alcohol fires ventilated at a design exit flow rate of 500 1/s (the inserted 
sketch illustrates air flow direction through the test cell). Net flow is 
always nearly balanced for initial conditions and after steady state has been 
achieved. But during the period of intense fire growth, fire size dictates 
the pattern of air flow in the system. These data show that large fast 
growing fires can cut off all air flow into an enclosure, and indeed cause 
heated combustion gases to flow out of inlet ventilation ports. 
RESULTS 
Figures 39 and 40 show specific temperature patterns measured by a 
thermocouple rake in test cell center regions. These temperature signatures 
are recorded here to illustrate changes in internal enclosure enthalpy 
relative to fire strength and initial ventilation setting. Figure 39 displays 
temporal increase of individual thermocouple stations along the rake. 
Temperature records from two topmost thermocouples are not included because we 
lacked capacity in computer readout for analog display. Omission of these 
data on Fig. 39 is irrelevant in defining the extent of hot layer after 
guasi-steady state conditions are achieved, since at fire strength greater 
* Listed flow daca given in grams/second (g/s) to facilitate mass balance 
correlations. 
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than 200 kW, upper test cell measured temperature magnitudes are coincident. 
Digital data collected from all stations are used for temporal variation 
information. 
Figure 40 shows data from the thermocouple rake where fire strength 
varied from 200 to 400 to 800 kW in discrete steps. Between 200 and 400 kW, 
measurements were made of the cooling test cell for about 200 s as a check on 
instrumentation integrity. All temperature data exhibits monotonic decrease 
in this period except for channel zero (20 cm from floor) which increases, 
slightly, probably due to some mixing process and/or mass diffusion occurring 
during post fi^e plume conditions. 
Fire -nuensity was increased from 400 to 800 kW without a cooling period 
between. Temperature rise in upper volume gases of test cell increases 
lineally with doubling fire strength. Achievement of nearly steady-state 
conditions occurs quite rapidly, usually within 150 s as indicated by 
established temperature levels within the enclosure. All parameters exhibit 
slight monotonically changing trends with time as second-order heat-transfer 
processes progress. However, primarily flow and thermal conditions are 
established from which pertinent information can be derived. 
Figure 41 describes descent of 70°C temperature isotherm for fires of 
various strengths. These data show that rate of descent is relatively 
constant for fires burning at 200 kW or better. The largest variation in this 
group occurs upon approac*. ,o tizac level. Time delay between start of this 
apparent descent from enclosure ceiling is directly related to fire strength. 
Note, these data were transcribed directly from individual temperature 
readings of the thermocouple rake. 
Figures 42 through 44 show guasi-steady-state vertical temperature 
distribution (t = 480 s) at thermocouple rake for the complete set of fires 
conducted in this series. Tnese data show definite establishment of 
essentially constant temperature in upper enclosure volume for all fires. 
Shape of temperature distribution near the floor seems more dependent on fire 
strength, (i.e., for fire strength less than 200 kW, temperature gradient to 
floor is quite sltdp). Temperature slope above the steep portion is more 
gradual to the enclosure level where the upper volume temperatures become more 
or less constant. Breakpoint between these two temperature regimes ranges 
around 1.5 m from the floor. Ventilation effects are graphically illustrated 
in Fig. 44. The central curve (800 kW at 250 1/s, propyl alcohol) is 
displaced to lower temperatures because of inadequate air for complete 
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combustion. This fire visually produced many times the smoke concentration of 
adequately ventilated propyl alcohol fires. 
Figure 45 is a composite of curves showing differences in vertical 
temperature gradient for spray fires at 500-1/s ventilation rate. Examples of 
heat transfer and combustion gas character are shown in Figs. 46 and 47 
respectively. Figure 35 shows the plan view location of surface contact 
sensors and heat sensors recordtd in Fig. 46. Temperature measurements on 
specific surfaces in Fig. 46 were made by thermocouples in compression contact 
with the surface. No attempt was made to shield thermocouple beads, 
consequently temperature measurement is not solely that of surface. 
Radiometer and calorimeter traces indicate flux levels at indicated 
locations. Decay of radiometer trace directly correlates to conditions of 
oxygen depletion shown in Fig. 47. Here two oxygen traces reflect oxygen 
concentration in both test cell and at duct gas pick-up station. Production 
of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and unburned hydrocarbons reflect the 
pattern of oxygen consumption. Test cell trace of oxygen depletion shows more 
sensitivity to internal test cell conditions than does data taken from the 
in-duct station. However, this is apparent only after termination of fuel 
spray. Up to this time the correlation is remarkable. 
Table 5 summarizes experiments conducted during this test series. This 
list gives design heat-release rate and volumetric exit air flow rate. In 
addition fuel flow rate and initial observations are recorded. 
A continuous color video monitor surveyed flame characteristics 
throughout each experiment. Recorded from these tapes are: flame height and 
flame appearance. One observation derived from these records was that during 
early fire stages, fuel over spray probably . esulted in lower-than-design 
heat-release rate. Within 100 s of initiation, however, all indications of 
over-spray disappear and we are assured of total fuel spray contribution to 
the combustion process. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis procedures have been in progress since the test series was 
completed in July 1981, and are not yet complete. Because we are attempting 
to develop data for model validation, we must understand ar.d account for all 
anomalies and inconsistencies developed during experimental measurements and 
data reduction. We began to notice such anomalies (during low-fire tests with 
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methane as fuel) when attempting to resolve combustion enthalpy calculations 
with heat-release-rate determinations by oxygen depletion measurements. 
Prior to obtaining absolute calibration of the methane rotameter, we found 
gross differences between heat-release-rate results calculations based on 
methane fuel flow rate, oxygen depletion, and CO/CO, production. After much 
agonizing, extensive cross checks, and ultimately an absolute calibration of 
the rotameter we determined that both our experimental fuel flow rates and 
oxygen depletion measurements were wrong because of experimental indiscretions 
and masking of true oxygen readings by water of combustion. Another possible 
anomaly is that equilibrium in oxygen is not achieved between fire olume and 
gas sampling station. Our major error in measuring gas flow rate was that we 
neglected to track gas pressure and temperature through the flow rater. Thus 
we cannot translate volumetric flow to mass flow for gaseous fuel measurements. 
We have made some reasonable estimates of mass flow rate which produce fuel 
enthalpy magnitudes that balance fairly well with heat-release-rate 
calculations based on CO/CO formation. Fig. 48 shows this comparison in 
terms of elemental balance between input carbon from methane fuel and output 
carbon in form of CO, CO. and measured partially oxidized hydrocarbon 
fractions. The curve indicates incomplete combustion because nei: carbon input 
is greater than zero. However, design ventilation rate is about 50 times that 
necessary for complete combustion; so the only explanation of sense is that 
methane flow rate is substantially in error. Similarly, hydrogen and mass 
balance calculations give questionable results. 
Calculatior.al procedures of correction and balance equations are 
contained in Appendix B. All data were subjected to treatment by these 
factors, and were found in conformance with balanced conditions, especially 
after steady-state was approached. Precise measurement of volumetric fuel 
flow rate for liquid fuels absolved inaccuracies of energy input parameters, 
and combustion heat-release-rate measurements balanced (using CO/CO 
production rate as a means of heat determination) in all but one test where 
fire was designed to be ventilation controlled. 
Because we began to suspect the oxygen depletion measurements, oxygen 
balances contained in Appendix B are based on CO/CO_ data. Figure 49 
compares total combustion heat-release rate from: CO/CO production 
measurements, 0 2 depletion measurements, and 0, depletion calculated from 
CO/CO measurements. Oxygen heat-release-rate calculations from measured 
data exhibit extreme noise resulting from amplification of experimental 
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fluctuations by the heat of combustion multiplier. Data trends, however, are 
obvious showing major difference between CO/CO and 0 derived values. 
Figure 50 is an example of elemental balance for sprayed propyl alcohol 
fuel, at a design rate of 440 1/s. Balanced conditions after quasi-
equilibrium is attained show validity of balancing procedures and define the 
fire as being fully ventilated where all fuel is converted to simple 
products. Equations for balance parameters, BASIC program, and program notes 
are attached as Appendix B along with an example test series for comparative 
purposes. Table 6* and supplemental symbol glossary collect pertinent 
parameters of all tests conducted during this experimental series. Listed 
data was recorded after quasi-steady-state conditions \-ere achieved. The 
first column lists parameters defined in attached glossary. The top row 
defines test sequence in terms of fire strength (1st number) and chronology 
(2nd number). In all, we conducted 12 separate experiments, 2 of which (2nd 
numbers 121 to 12II1, and 131 to 13III) consisted of 3 changes in fire 
strength durjrg the period of the test. Designed and corrected parameters, 
along with pertinent thermal energy data, estimated and measured temperatures, 
and thermal energy ratios complete the table. 
A particularly interesting trend appears for all tests which indicates 
that most of the energy released by these fires in this test cell is absorbed 
by enclosure surfaces. Greater than 70 percent of released heat is absorbed 
in these surfaces where the trend of energy deposit is (slightly) inversely 
proportional to ventilation rate. 
MODEL VALIDATION 
Data in Table 6 were developed to check predictions of contemporary fire 
spread models. Predicted parameters are constrained to specific flow and 
temperature conditions described in Table 2. Interfacial height between hot 
and cool layer in a naturally ventilated room is well defined because of 
density and flow regimes established through enclosure openings. Fires in 
enclosures with forced ventilation will produce heated volumes of gas in 
ceiling regions. But (depending on forced ventilation patterns) distinct 
layers with sharp interfacial boundaries will not be established. Instead a 
* Table 6 collects more than specific experimental data and corrections. 
These factors will be employed subsequently. 
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monotonic temperature gradiant will exist between a more-or-less uniform hot 
volume and the floor plane as indicated in Figs. 42 through 45. 
For model validation, these data must be constrained to two layers 
separated by a definite interfacial boundary. Fortunately, this need was 
7 8 foreseen by Speckler at Harvard ' who proposed a procedure of mass and 
energy conservation along the air-temperature gradient to force such data into 
two distinct layers.* 
Figure 51 compares vertical temperature distribution. With Speckler's 
two-layer calculation, both simple and complicated integration procedures were 
used to establish Speckler's interface height and lower-layer temperature 
level. The simpler integration procedure is more than adequate for these 
calculations. Figure 52 is a display of the descent rate of the pseudo 
(Speckler) interface. Comparison of these estimates with Fig. 41 is 
reasonable. Table 7 compiles two-layer calculations for the range of fire 
strength data developed during this test series. 
Our major goal in refining these data was to provide the best test data 
possible for model validation. Our adoption of Cal-Tech's room-filling 
model for preliminary analysis was motivated by its ease of application and 
flexibility in terms of input modification practices. 
Before experimental data was reduced to values contained in Table 6, the 
Cal-Tech model was applied to our proposed design conditions by several 
individuals at Los Alamos, LLNL, and Cal-Tech** along with an independent 
model developed at Los Alamos. Table 8 collects these predictions along with 
design test conditions and final corrected test data. 
Bolsted, Creighton, and Zukoski applied the Cal-Tech model each with some 
variation of input parameters. Required data is: combustion heat release 
rate, enclosure ventilation rate and position of ventilation source and 
exhaust sites. Ad hoc heat transfer and fuel efficiency factors are applied 
by the user. Creighton did not apply any heat loss conditions and Zukoski 
* Speckler's procedures, derived algorithms and BASIC program are attached 
as Appendix C. 
t Model description and references are contained in Reference 3 
(UCRL-53179). 
**Los Alamos Modelers were John Bolsted and Fritz Krause. Livermore Modeler 
was John Creighton and Cal-Tech Modeler was Ed Zukoski. 
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included a set of enclosure surface heat loss values varying from 0.1 to 0.8 
(results all contained on Table 8). Krause's model LAFM (Los Alamos Fire 
Model) uses mass burning rate, combustion product thermochemistry and 
volumetric flowrate, based on maximum ceiling temperature data from tests to 
predict compartment heat-release time histories. Bolsted uses some LAFM data 
for combustion heat-release input to his trials with the Cal-Tech model. We 
note that all models suffer from the fact that design and final corrected data 
differ for many of the tests, moreover, stepped fire strength data has not yet 
been modeled. Thus we display these comparisons in Table 8 for preliminary 
review only. Listed experimental data is adjusted to two-layer conditions via 
Specifier's procedures; T is an average of measured temperature in uppar 
regions of the test cell where essentially uniform conditions are established 
after Quasi-Steady State is reached. From T , we employ Speckler's 
procedure to calculate T and H . Thus T is the only actual measured 
quantity on Table 8. 
Cal-Tech and LAFM predict only steady-state T and IL. Preliminary 
comparison of data and model predictions indicates trends only, e.g., 
enclosure heat loss considerations produce better model results at high fire 
strength, energy balance considerations between upper- and quasi-lower-layer 
may serve to bring predicted T to more realistic levels, and model H 
U L 
values bear small resemblance to either Speckler's calculation or the lower-
region temperature gradient in the test cell. 
FIRE CHEMISTRY: THERMAL DEGRADATION OF WIRE AND CABLE INSULATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Last year's study on thermal degradation of representative cable 
insulations showed that the mode of decomposition of the insulations is 
influenced by the antioxidants, plasticizers, stabilizers and flame retardants 
that are incorporated in the plastic formulations. Some of the additives 
enhance the rate of decomposition of the pure polymer and/or thermally degrade 
into flammable species which help to feed the flame. 
We learned that the mode of thermal degradation also depends upon the 
radiiot flux level used to irradiate the plastics. Low levels such as 
o 2.5 W/cm lead predominantly to low concentrations of cyclic and polycyclic 
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hydrocarbons; a flux of 5.0 W/cm forms a great variety of compounds ranging 
from acid ions and simple saturated hydrocarbons to complex polycyclic 
2 
compounds. An irradiance level of 8.0 W/cm results mainly in acid ions and 
unsaturated hydrocarbons and polycyclic compounds. 
This year we extended our study to a number of additional cable and wire 
insulations as well as to virgin polymers. Having subjected approximately 100 
different insulations to thermogravimetric (TG) analysis and categorized them 
into 25 groupings, we performed an in-depth analysis on the thermal 
degradation of eleven such insulations. We subjected our samples to TGA and 
differential scanning calorimetric measurements (DSC) at different heating 
rates. We paid particular attention to the generation of corrosive substances 
during the different phases of pyrolysis, as these ar^ detrimental to high-
value instrumentation. In addition, we also looked at the kinetics of 
degradation of the insulations at the dehydrochlorination region, or acid ion 
producing region, and the non-corrosive thermal degradation products generated 
at the different phases. We compared our result** to those oBtained from 
virgin polymers. 
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
In the first set of experiments, virgin polymers, several polyvinyl 
chloride insulations, and rubber insulations comprised of neoprene and 
chlorinated and sulfonated polyethylene were heated in our thermal gravimetric 
analyzer at a rate of 10, 20 and 40°C/min in air from ambient temperature to 
900°C. We monitored the samples' weight as a function of temperature and 
their rate of weight change with a multichannel recorder. This information 
was also stored on a magnetic tape which was subsequently retrieved by our 
PDP-11 computer and used in calculating activation energies in the 
dehydrochlorination region. In addition, we also measured the generation of 
corrosive gases, mainly acidic components, as a function of temperature. This 
was done by directing the thermal degradation products formed by the samples 
in the TGA to a container filled with 200 ml of distilled water buffered to pH 
6.8-7.0. The aqueous solution was gently stirred with a magnetic stirrer to 
achieve uniform mixing. The change in pH (predominantly caused by formation 
of HC1) was measured with a pencil-size pH reference electrode as a function 
of temperature and monitored by our multichannel recorder. This simple 
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approach gave us a visual correlation between weight loss, the generation of 
corrosive gases and the initial temperature at which these gases are formed. 
All differential scanning calorimetric analyses were performed on a 
DuPont 900 Differential Scanning Calorimeter using a standard cell. Our 
samples weighed between 6 and 10 mg and were heated in air at 20°C/min. 
In the second set of experiments we attempted to see if there are 
differences in the general types of products formed in the various poises of 
pyrolysis (as seen by our TGA measurements). Such information would aid us to 
better understand the mode of decomposition and thereby determine the 
differences in the formulations of the various composite polymers. 
Such knowledge is particularly helpful in identifying those formulations 
which either contain highly flammable additives (e.g., phthalate plasticizers) 
or additives which in themselves are not Jlammable but at high enough 
temperature form either highly flaiimable species which will contribute to 
flame spread or degrade to highly toxic products which will create an extra 
health hazarc to firefighters. 
We used samples weighing between 10 and 25 mg to generate the degradation 
products. They were heated in air at 20°C/min in our TG apparatus and the 
resulting degradation products were collected on the TGA furnace tube at 
predetermined weight loss steps. Separate runs were made for each collection 
step. After each collection, the furnace tube was cooled to room temperature 
and then washed with methylene dichloride in preparation for GC/MS analyses. 
Each extractant was concentrated down to 0.5 ml and a 3-microliter aliquot was 
injected on a 25-meter Carbowax 20-M fused silica capillary column. The 
column oven was programmed from 70"C to 220°C at a rate of 10'C/min, helium 
flow rate was maintained at 6 ml/min, and the injection port, mass spec 
transfer line and jet separator were set at 250°C. The components comprising 
the separated peaks were identified with the help of our computerized spectral 
library system. In this system, the spectra of unknown compounds are compared 
to approximately 40,000 compounds stored on a library disk pack, and the 1C 
best matches compounds are printed out. These then are subjected to a 
spectral-cmpare program where the masses of the sample peak and those of -he 
library hit were printed in graphic form for easier comparison of mass peak 




The PVC insulation used in our experiments was designed for high-power 
electrical cables/ multi-strand general-purpose cables and general appliances 
cables. 
The TGA's of all formulations as well as of the pure polymer show three 
regions of decomposition. There is the initial rapid weight loss, which is 
primarily the result of a loss of HC1 and the degradation of a plasticizer. 
The dehydrochlorination reaction leads to the formation of long, conjugated 
polyvinyl structures. The second region involves the decomposition of the 
residual cross-linked polymer chains and the third region is thought to be due 
to a very slow degradation of the polymer's charlike residue. The initial 
region of degradation is preceded by an induction period which had been 
9 attributed by Dresdow and Gibbs to activation of weak links in the polymer. 
We showed that the general shape of the curves changes with additives 
used in the formulations as well as heating rates. Figure 53 contrasts the 
thermograms of four different types of insulations and virgin PVC heated in 
air at 20°C/min. The greatest difference appears in PVC-104 which is an 
insulation used for high-voltage cable. We see that the induction phase 
begins at 40°C and phase one, which is associated with acid ion production, 
shows considerably lower overall weight loss as well as rate of weight loss in 
comparison to the other types of PVC insulation. The insulation which 
exhibits the largest amount of weight loss and the highest rate of degradation 
is PVC-3 which approaches the degradation rates of virgin PVC. 
The effect of heating rates on the degradation of the various PVC 
form- iations in the acid ion production phase are summarized in Table 9. As 
expected the higher heating rates lead to higher degradation rates and thereby 
faster production of acid ions. However, the faster heating rates do not 
increase the overall weight loss in the acid ion production phase and 
therefore the total production of acid ions remains constant with increased 
heating rates. We also found that higher heating rates lower the temperature 
responsible for the initial degradation of PVC-78 and PVC-95 but do not do so 
in the insulations labelled PVC-3 and PVC-104. This is most likely due to the 
different additives used in the different formulations. The different 
additives also influence the amount of char formed in the various polymers as 
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measured at 600°C. For example, PVC-3 shows a char residue of 12%, PVC-78 a 
residue of 33%, PVC-95 a residual char of 38% and PVC-104 left a char residue 
of 6%. In contrast, virgin polymer did not leave any residue at 600°C. The 
principal char-forming additives used in the PVC formulations, associated with 
fire retardance, are Sb 0 , alumina trihydrate, calcinated clay and phosphate 
esters. Depending upon the manufacturer, the commonly used PVC formulations 
contain anywhere between one and three of the above additives in a single 
formulation. 
The activation energies for the different formulations were calculated 
according to the Arrhenius relationship and are based on the lst-order 
kinetics in the dehydrochlorination region. The values obtained for PVC-95 
and "vc-78 are 21.5 kcal/mol and that for PVC-104 is 33 l;cal/mol. These 
activation energies are somewhat lower than those reported for pure PVC 
polymers, which agrees with the literature findings that plasticizers 
decrease thermal stability of PVC. Since PVC-3 did not generate acid ions 
via th'i lst-order kinetics we did not calculrte the activation energy foe this 
insulation. 
The presence of plasticizers in o^r PVC composites was confirmed by our 
DSC and GC/MS studies. Figures 54 and 55 show DSC curves of pure PVC polymer 
as well as polymer plastics heated in air at ?0°C/min. PVC-3, 95, and 104 
show an exotherm between 262-274°C which we attribute to the presence of a 
metal oxide such as zinc or ferric oxide. The broad endotherms showing twe 
peaks between 280 and 330 in PVC'5-J, 78, and 95 coincide with dehydro­
chlorination of the PVC insulation and the decomposition of the plasticizer 
dioctylphthalate (DOP). The fact that DOP is included in these formulations 
is attributed to the presence of acetic anhydride in the degradation products 
of PVC-3 and 78. Although at this time we did not analyze the degradation 
products of PVC-95 it is logical to assume that its endotherms at 295°C and 
330°C are due also to dehydrochlorination of the insulation and decomposition 
of DOP. PVC-104 shows two endotherms at 105°C and 119°C which might be due to 
the melting of the crystalline regions of what seems to be a PVC composite. 
The exotherm at 268°C is again probably due to a metal oxide and the two 
endotherms at 280°C and 283°C are due to the presence of the plasticizers. 
From the GC/WS analysis of the thermal degradation products we feel that the 
plasticizers are probably calcium stearate as well as dibutylene dilaurate. 
The thermal degradation products generated during and post the dehydro­
chlorination phase are included in Tables 10-14. The tables include only 
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those products which were condensed on the walls of the TGA glass tube; 
therefore the lighter-molecular-weight gaseous products are excluded from the 
table. In addition products retained on the Carbowax-20M capillary column are 
also excluded from the tables. As in our previous report we attempted to 
categorize the various compounds according to their probable health and 
flammability and reactivity hazards. The hazards, assigned according to the 
recommendations of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), are those 
that might be encountered by firemen fighting fires involving plastic 
insulation materials. The system used by NFPA identifies the hazards of a 
chemical in terms of three categories, namely, health, flammability and 
reactivity and iL indicates the order of severity in each of these categories 
by five divisions ranging from four indicating a severe hazard to 0 indicating 
no special hazard. 
An important observation pertaining to all these tables is that there is 
very little information on the hazards of the compounds formed during 
pyrolysis and combustion of these plastics. 
The overall analysis of the tables shows that the degradation of the 
plasticizers occurs during the dehydrochlorination region and the components 
collected after the dehydrochlorination region consist mainly of the poly-
nuclear hydrocarbons as would be expected from the decomposition of the 
residual cross-linked polymer chains. 
Rubber Insulations 
The rubber insulations were designed for high-power high-current cables, 
welding cables, single-conductor high-voltage cables, and multiconductor power 
cables. 
The insulations consisted of neoprene, or polychloroprene, and 
chlorinated and sulfonated polyethylene. 
Figure 56 shows thermograms of the various rubber formulations heated in 
air at 20°C/min as compared to the pure polychloroprene polymer. While the 
thermograms have notable differences they all exhibit to some extent three 
distinct weight-loss regions. The first phase shows a rapid loss in weight 
which is associated with the release of HC1 from the polymer chain. 
Essentially all of the chlorine content is liberated at these temperatures. 
Good-quality compositions of neoprene and sulfonated and chlorinated 
polyethylene contain approximately 15% chlorine by weight, based on chlorine 
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contents of 37.5 and 35% for polymers of neoprene and chlorinated and 
sulfonated polyethylene. While HC1 separates from the polymer chains, the 
degree to which it is released to the atmosphere is dependent on compound 
formulation as discussed later in the report. The second phase shows a 
gradual loss in weight which is attributed to gradual oxidation of the highly 
cross-linked carbonaceous residue of the polymer chain. At about 500°C we see 
another rapid-weight-loss region which some authors attribute to ignition of 
12 the carbonaceous residue. 
A study of the curves reveals distinct differences in starting 
temperatures leading to HC1 formation, duration of HC1 evolution and the rate 
of acid ion production. This is further substantiated by Figs. 57 and 58 
which show the acid ion production along with the individual rubber insulation 
thermograms. The higher temperature leading to formation of HC1 shown in 
neoprene-118, neoprene-435r and neoprene-007 might be due to presence of acid 
acceptors in the formulations such as ZnO, MgO or Sb.O reacting with the 
HC1 evolved at lower temperatures. The weight loss occurring below 300 is 
attributed by some researchers to loss of water of hydration from the hydrated 
alumina present in many of the formulations. TEe incorporation of CaCO in 
some of the formulation would lower the total ion production as CaCO, would 
wait with the formed HC1 according to the following equation: 
CaCO, + 2 HC1 = CaCl„ + H„0 + CO.. 3 2 2 2 
The activation energies for the different formulations were again 
calculated according to the Arrhenius relationship and are based on the 1st-
order kinetics in the dehydrochlorination region. The value obtained for 
neoprene-118 is 32 kcal/mol and for neoprene-435 it is 26 kcal/mol. These 
values are as observed in the PVC formulations somewhat lower from the values 
reported for pure polymers. Again we attribute this discrepancy to the 
presence of plasticisers such as alkylphthalates, dioctylphthalates, or 
calcium stearate. At this time we have yet to determine the activation 
energies of polychloroprene, rubber-134 and neoprene-84. 
The effect of heating rates in the dehydrochlorination region of the 
rubber insulations are shown in Table 15. As observed in the various PVC 
formulations the higher heating rates result in higher degradation rates and 
therefore faster production of HC1. Of the insulations studied neoprene-435 
degrades with the fastest rate and neoprene-84 degrades with the lowest rate 
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and the same time leaves the highest amount of char. We also observed that 
higher heating rates do not necessarily increase the overall weight loss in 
the dehydrochlorination region and with the exception of neoprene-118 do not 
lower the temperature responsible for the initial degradation of the 
insulations. As in the case of the PVC insulations, we attribute the above 
differences to the different additives used in the various insulations. For 
example plasticizers such as triisodecyl, in the absence of phosphate esters, 
would enhance the degradation rate of the insulation material and fail to 
substantially increase the final char residue. On the other hand the char 
residue would be increased and the rate of degradation decreased if a flame 
retardant such as tricresyl phosphate were included in a formulation 
containing a flammable plasticizer such as triisodecyl or dioctylphthalate. 
Figure 59 further illustrates the effect of additives on the degradation 
scheme of the insulations. Thus, neoprene-118 shows two exotherms at 309°C 
and 325°C which we attribute to dehydrochlorination of the insulation and 
decomposition of a plasticizer used in the formulation. Neoprene-84 shows a 
sharp exotherm at 250°C which is probably due to decomposition of a metal 
oxide, an exotherm at 375°C which might be attributed to loss of water from 
CaCO and an exotherm at 412°C which is in the dehydrochlorination and 
desulfonation region of this insulation. Neoprene-007 shows two exotherms at 
330°C and 337°C which we again attribute to decomposition of metal oxides and 
dehydrochlorination of the insulation plastic. Neoprene cable-435 shows two 
exotherms at 331"C and 336°C which we attribute to degradation of the 
insulation and plasticizers, an exotherm at 375°C which is probably due to 
oxidation of the highly cross-linked region. In contrast, the DSC curve for 
polychloroprene shows an exotherm at 350°C which occurs at the 
dehydrochlorination region and several small exotherms between 425°C and 450°C 
which we attribute to the oxidation of the highly cross-linked region. 
Rubber-134 shows an exotherm at 250°C which again is attributed to the 
decomposition of a metal oxide; two exotherms at 375°C and 387"C which is in 
the dehydrochlorinaMon region and which we attribute to decomposition of the 
insulator and plasticizer. 
Tables 16-21 show thermal degradation products generated during and post 
the dehydrochlorination region of the different rubber insulations heated in 
air at 20°C/min. As in the case of the PVC formulations main components 
comprising the mixture of these degradation products are the higher-molecular-
weight components as separated on Carbowax-20M capillary column. It is 
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conceivable, therefore, thft the mixture contains other compounds which may 
have remained unresolved on this column. 
The tables again show that although the dehydrochlorination region leads 
mainly to the production of HCl other products are also formed both from the 
decomposition of the insulation material and additives such as plasticizers, 
stabilizers and organic flame retardants that were included in the 
formulation. As previously noted with the PVC formulation, higher 
temperatures, as exhibited in the post-dehydrochlorination region, lead to the 
formation of various higher-molecular-weight compounds ranging from straight-
chain hydrocarbons to long-chain acids and alcohols as well as polycyclic 
compounds. The nature of the mixture will depend upon the exact formulation 
of the insulator. Ke also observe that as with the degradation products from 
PVC there is very little information on the hazards of the compounds generated 
during pyrolysis and combustion of the various insulations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of our study show that: 
• The mode of thermal decomposition of the insulations is influenced 
by the composition of the formulations of the insulations. The prespnce of 
some plasticizers, such as dioctylphthalates or triisodecyl, will enhance the 
flamii.ability of both PVC and rubber insulations and therefore if used in the 
formulation of either of these insulations should be accompanied by flame 
retardants such as tricresyl phosphate. The presence of acid acceptors (e.g., 
ZnO, MgO or Sb 0 and CaCO ) will influence how much HCl will be released into 
the environment. 
» The acid ion production is enhanced by higher heating rates. 
However higher heating rates do not increase the total acid ion production nor 
decrease the final char residue. 
• In general, flame retardants, e.g., Sb 0 , alumina trihydrate, 
and triaryl phosphates, increase charring and decrease the rate of degradation 
especially in the dehydrochlocination region. 
• There is very little information on the hazards of the compounds 
formed during pyrolysis and combustion of the plastics. 
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PHYSICAL SMOKE STUDIES 
A description of our efforts to design and construct a usable smoke 
dilution system is included as Appendix D. 
Also included in Appendix D is a survey of state-of-the-art commercial 
fire detectors. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Table 1 lists the goals we have been pursuing since the beginning of the 
project and Fig. 60 maps our milestones for FY'82 and FY'83. 
A significant advance in FY'81 is that we have begun preliminary 
validation of our experimental and analytical techniques. Furthermore, many 
of the component parts of the program are beginning to gel into the major 
goals listed in Table 1. 
Some specific examples are the following: 
Fire chemistry 
• Acid ion analysis: the small-scale acid ion sampling technique has 
proven to be a very useful and efficient tool for screening cable types to be 
tested in our large-scale apparatus. 
• In the next fiscal year we will be using this tool extensively for 
screening. More importantly, we will be sampling from the large-scale 
experiments in an attempt to obtain correlations (to small scale). Such a 
finding would validate the small-scale technique as a useful and inexpensive 
method for insulation specification (for corrosive potential). 
• Identification of combustion-gas components and degradation 
mechanisms will give insights for formulation changes for improved fire 
performance. 
Physical Smoke 
Dilution system: although our attempts to construct a usable smoke 
dilution system to date have been frustrating, much has been learned from the 
experience. The design presented in Appendix D, however, shows a great deal 
of promise. The determination of size, quantity, and the rate of production 
of combustion particulates from specific fuels present in energy technology 
projects is essential to predict response times for fire detection devices, 





Validation burns: the first series of semi-ideal burns presented in this 
report have yielded encouraging results for our modeling efforts. The 
modeling portion of this project is the heart of the methodology. This tool 
will predict the potential size and growth rate of a fire in specific energy 
technology facility spaces. It will also predict when fire detection and 
suppression systems will intervene. These are the primary components defining 
damage and 3oss and ultimately fire risk. More semi-ideal burns are planned 
in FY'82 and also large-scale vertical cable burns. 
Large-scale Cable Burns 
Although the large-scale cable burns we have completed to date were very 
crude, they did provide us with sufficient insight for the design of an 
appropriate experimental apparatus. Moreover, we have been able to roughly 
contrast the effects of scaling on the results (i.e., heat-release rate and 
ease of ignition to large-scale tests). We will be performing a number of 
"second-generation" experiments in FY 182 utilizing those cable types tested in 
small scale. It is intended that we will be able to describe the burning 
characteristics of vertical cable arrays in terms which will provide relevant 
input into our fire modeling and fire chemistry. Hopefully, we will be able 
to see some correlation between the large- and small-scale results. 
Risk Analysis 
The preliminary risk analysis of Shiva experiment included as Appendix A, 
performed with Econ, Inc., is an illustration of how fire risk will be defined 
for fire protection decision-making purposes. In a general sense, it is 
fairly easy to see the impact of fire loss once monetary and programmatic 
delay times are placed on "critical" experimental spaces. In the next fiscal 
year we will expand this survey to other selected energy research facilities. 
The milestones chart (Fig. 60) delineates the sub-tasks which must be 
completed to achieve the major goals for this program. These major goals are 
all necessary to produce the end result which is a standard guide of fire 
management tactics for large energy research facilities. It is appropriate to 
describe the significance of each of the major milestones as to their 
contribution to the ultimate goal. The tasks listed under "Fire Growth 
Parameters for Model Development" are a combination of small- and large-scale 
fire experiments to provide appropriate data input to our modeling efforts and 
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also as a particle model validation tool. Those tasks supporting "Smoke 
Aerosol Production and Transport; Physical and Chemical Characteristics," will 
help define two major phenomena: 
• Potential corrosive and particulate damage to experimental 
components. 
• Particulate analysis (size, distribution, etc.) will provide insight 
to the response times of smoke detection systems. 
The next two milestones are probably the most significant components of 
the research program. The modeling technique will predict the rate and extent 
of fire development in these facilities and the work on fire management 
systems will hopefully define how detection and suppression efforts affect the 
degree of fire damage. The "Advanced Fire Management System Development" 
phase will concentrate on unique detection and suppression systems to deal 
with very specific fire problems in energy facilities which traditional 
countermeasures cannot negate. 
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Figure 1. Schematic of overall logic of fire safety evaluation. 
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Figure 2. Photograph of magnetic 
tape rack. 
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Figure 5. Plot of air temperature next to sprinkler h<~ad. 
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Figure 6. Photograph oE fully developed magnetic tape hum. 
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Figure 9. Photograph of Halon sphere set-up with transducer. 
Figure 10. Photo of compartment set-up. 
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Figure 11. Diagram of compartment =>nd associated instrumentation. 




Figure 13. Halon sphere nozzle. 
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Figure 14. view of tape rack through compartment door. 
Figure 15. Bunsen burner ignition source. 
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Figure 16. Gypsum wallboard shield of programmed tapes. 
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Figure 18. Multiple temperature plots of bottom and middle rack from 
pre-programmed tape burn. 
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Figure 19. post-burn photograph of preprogrammed tapes from Experiment #1. 
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Figure 22. Temperature profile from compartment thermocouples—Experiment #1. 
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Figure 23. Temperature profile from compartment thermocouples—Experiment #2. 
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Figure 24. Prototype large-scale cable fire set-up. 
Figuie 25. Expanded metal grate clamped to top of pipe. 
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PVC COVER .41 " O.D. 
RAIDED COPPER SHIELD 
POLYETHYLENE .28" 
PVC CABLE RG II A/U 
PVC COVER 1.13" O.D. 
BRAIDED COPPER SHIELD 
POLYETHYLENE .63" 
PVC CABLE RG 220 A/U 
NEOPRENE COVER .38" O.D. 
•STRANDED CONDUCTOR 
NEOPRENE CABLE 
Figure 26. Cross-sectional composition of 1-in.- and 1/2-in.-diameter 
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Figure 27. Composite plot of temperatures within the pipe, for 
rubber-jacketed multiconc"uctor cable. 
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Figure 28. Composite plot of temperatures within the pipe, for 
rubber-jack^' 3 stranded copper cable. 
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Figure 29. Post-test photograph of rubber-jacketed cable. 
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Figure 32. Temperature profile for RG 11 A/0 cable burn. 
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EXPERIMLNTAL 
VENTILATION SYSTEM FIRE TEST ROOM 
DATA ACQUISITION AND 
REDUCTION ROOM 
v . v v ^ ' v t y > 












PIT FOR WASTE WATER 
COLLECTION 
Figure 33- Schematic of t e s t enclosure. 
3' dia pan 
Room dimension 20' L X 13'6" W X 15' H 
Door dimension 7' W X 8' H 
Figure 34. Schematic presenta t ion of per t inen t t e s t c e l l dimensions. 
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- 1 ' dia duct — I V long 
4 " dia holes - 5 1/2" OC 
20 holes both ducts 




Figure 36. Photographic views of test cell components and sensors 
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d. 
Figure 36. (Continued.) 
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Figure 37. Examples of non-smoky fuel fires. 
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Figure 40. Data from thermocouple rake where f i r e s t rength varied from 200 kW 

















1 \ '•• 
• 1 / 
> ! 1 \ ^ . 
i ! 
i ! 









— • 415 KW 
- - B03 KW 
T 1 1 •^ ^ 1 1 iee i5e 2se 
TIME IN SECONDS 
250 300 


















e r a M t C K H I 
* - * saw AT ZSBL/S ( icnwo • 
B ••« 1MM1 AT 9ML/S OCTHIC) 












A ..a A 
6^ 
S* 
• i i i i 1 1 
IUVLHHTIM.,C 
12i l t t 











(Til T NG ICIGHT 
B—B 2BBOI fiT 500L/S (ISOPROPYL) 
* • * 28BKW fiT 250L/S (ISOPROPIU 
»•-» ZBWH fiT 50BL/S (ItTHftNOL) *^
 
/:' i 
/ • ' 
_ X Z' 
• »"• 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
60 BB IBB 
TEWERftTlHE.C 
















*—* 400KW AT 580L/S (CETWWOL) 
*•••* 40004 AT 580L/S (ISOPROPH.) 
•—• 4B0KW AT ZSBL/S (ISOPHOPVL) 
•• -0 000KW AT 250L/S (I90PB0FM.) 
O -O 800KW AT 5BBL/S (ICTHANOL) 
•—» 80BKW AT 58BL/S (ISOPPOPYL) 







Figure 44. Quasi-steady-state vertical temperature distribution. 
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Figure 45. Composite of curves showing difference in vertical temperature 
gradient for spray fires at 500 1/s ventilation rate. 
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Figure 46. Specific surface temperature measurement as measured with 
thermocouples in compression contact with the surface. 
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SECONDS 
Figure 47. Computer p lo t t i ng of 0 2 deple t ion, CO, C0 2 , and r.nburned 
hydrocarbon production. 
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Figure 48. Elemental balance between input carbon from methane and output 
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Figure 49. Comparison of total combustion heat-release rate from: CO/C0 2 
production measurements, 0 2 depletion measurements, and 0 2 depletion 
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Figure 50. Elemental balance for sprayed propyl alcohol fuel, design 
ventilated at 440 1/s. 
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Figure 51. Comparison of vertical temperature distribution with Speckler't 
two-layer calculation. 
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Figure 52. Display of descent rate of pseudo (Speckler's) interface. 
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Figure 53. Comparison of thermograms of four different types of insulations 
and virgin PVC heated in air at 20'>c/min. 
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OSC's of Polyvinylchloride insulations 
heated in air at 20°C/min 
PVC-78 
Figure 54. DSC curves of pure PVC 
pnlymer as well as polymer plastics 
.teating in air at 20°C/min. 
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DSC's of pvc insulation heated 
in air at 20°C/min Figure 55. DSC curves of pure PVC 
polymer as well as polymer plastics 
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Figure 56. Thermograms of 
various rubber formulations 
heated in air at 20°C/min 
as compared to pure 
polychloroprene polymer. 
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Acid ion pioduction from Rubb?r-134 
heated in air at 20°C/min 
Frgure 57. Acid ion production and thermograms for individual rubber 
i n su l a t i ons . 
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HIGH ACID-ION PRODUCERS 
Acid ion production from Neoprene-435 
heated in air at 20°C/min 
Acid ion production from virgin Neoprene 
heated in air at 20c'C/min 
Acid ion production from Neoprene-007 
























Figure 58. Acid ion production and thermograms for individual rubber 
insulat ions. 
77 
DSC's o1 rubber and Neoprene insulations ". 
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Figure 59. DSCs of rubber and 
neoprene insulations heated in air 
at 20°C/min. 
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Fire Growth Parameters for Model 
Development 
o Quasi-ideal experiments for model 
verification 
o Small scale properties tests of 
electrical insulation 
o Full scale experiments with 
individual real facts 
o Full scale experiments with mixture 
real fuels 
Smoke Aerosol Production and 
Transport; Physical and Chemical 
Characteristics 
o Field prototype smoke dilution system 
o Smoke balance experiments - small 
scale 
o Gross chemical composition of smoke 
aerosol from electrical insulation 
fires 
o Critical effects of combustion 
conditions and heat on composition 
and physical structure of smoke 
aerosols 
o Time and dilution effects on 
physical and chemical smoke aerosols 
Adapt Modelinq Technique for Fire-Risk 
















o Preliminary protocol for fire-loss 
assessment 
o Protocol for fire risk assessment 
o Relate fire & smoke growth rate 
parameters to response and 
performance of hypothetical fire 
management systems 
o Develop recommendations for optimum 
fire management systems based on 
specific fire environments 
Advanced Fire Hanaqement System 
Development 
c Design smoke discriminating 
detection system 
o Performance of selected 
extingu shants on flammable 













extinguishing systems for 
compatibilit; in dispensing several 
different agents or combination of 
agents 
system, e.g., discriminating 
detection and multiple extinguishants 
First Draft of Standard Guide of Fire-
Manaqement Tactics for Large Enerqy 
Research Facilities 
Figure 60. Milestones chart for FY'82 and FY'63. 
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Table 1. Program Object ives . 
FAULT-TRES ANALYSIS 
A. Major goal: Parallel development of 
fire safety with fusion energy 
technology. 
B. Define the engineering performance of 
state-of-the-art fire protection as 
applied to fusion energy experiments. 
C. Develop rational methods of assessing 
fault modes in fire protection systems. 
FIRE GROWTH ANALYSIS 
D. Develop techniques for defining fire 
hazards of fusion energy experiments. 
E. Couple hazards analysis with fire 
protection systems ?->alysis for LLNL 
facilities. 
F. Develop survey protocol for fusion 
energy experiments at non-L^NL 
facilities and validate. 
FIRE SAFETY EVALUATION G. Analyze survey results and evaluate 
fire safety of each installation. 
H. Conduct research to solve identified 
problems. 
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Table 2. List of measured parameters along with design fire strength and 
ventilation variations. 
Measured Quantities 
• Fuel flow rate 
• Inlet and outlet air flow rate 
• Temperatures: 
wall S ceiling 
3-D array - test cell (27 sites) 
exhaust force stream 
vortical rake (10 sites, 1-ft increments) 
combustion plume 




• Enclosure pressure (temporal) 
• Video of combustion plume 




• Sr fie humidity (temporal) (in exit duct) 




7ire Strength Variation 
50 kW, 100 kW, 200 kW, 400 kW, 800 kW 
Ventilation Variation 
250 1/s (500 cfm), 500 1/s (1000 cfm) 
Comparative Parameters for Model and Experiment 
• Ceiling layer growth 
• Temperature rise in ceiling layer 
• Inlet air flow rate as controlled by temperature and pressure condition in 
test cell 
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Table 3. Instrument type, calibration, and precision of devices used for 
sensing parameters of test cell fires and associated ventilation flow 
characteristics. 
• Oxygen Depletion: 
Beckman model 402: 5ppm-l% accuracy, response time: 90%, 1 s 
Beckman model OH-11: ±5% full scale accuracy, response time: 90%, 
80 Us (exit c'uctj 
• CO Formation: 
Beckman model 864: 1% full scale accuracy, response time: 90%, .5 s 
• CO Formation: 
Beckman model B64: ±1% full scale, response time: 90%, .5 s 
• Ceiling, Wall Temp: 
Type K TCs (exposed bead, avg. 22, c".t'omel-alumel) 
• Rake: 
Type K TCs (exposed bead, chromel-alumel .005 diam) 
• Outlet i Inlet Test Cell Ventilation Rate: 
Orifice differential pressure 
Vane anemometers - R. H. Young: very linear response above 1 m/s (2.2 
mph). Thi^shold speed (lower) 0.2 m/s (0.4 mph) ±2% accuracy. 
• Humidity: from wet bulb, dry bulb, relative humidity taken from 
stoichiometric chart in Industrial Ventilation from wet bulb, dry bLlb 
values. 
• ftmbient Temperature: from initial conditions of rake, TC's where rakes 
not available (cell 1,7) 
• Pressure: P24 Validyne transducers 
Range: ±.01 to ±3000 psia; 0.1 to 3000 psia full scale 
Stability: ±0.1%/supply voltage change from ±22 to ±35 VDC 
• Radiant Energy: Hi Cal Radiometer and Calorimeters 
• Liquid Fuel Flow: Flow rater FP-1/2-27-G-10/58. Calibration of constant 
pressure - where flow rate is metered by value 
• Gas fuel flow: flow-rater factory calibrated for methane 
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Table 4. Air flow balance data for 200-kW, 400-kW, and 800-kW propyl alcohol 
fires ventilated at design exit flow rate of 500 1/s. 
I n i t i a l Max. o u t f l o w S t e a d v - s t a t e 
F o r c e d 
< 9 / s f 
F r e t 
(9/=> 
Net 
( 9 / s ) 
F o r c e d 
t 9 / s > 
F r e e 
I g / s ) 
Net 
19 / s ) 
F o r c e d 
<9/s> 
F r e e 
I g / s ) 
N e t 
( 9 / s ) 
200 kW - 4 9 6 + 537 +41 - 5 5 0 + 89 - 4 6 7 - 4 3 4 +437 + 3 
4 00 kW - 5 1 2 + 501 -11 - 5 5 6 - 47 - o 0 3 - 4 1 0 + 3B9 - 2 1 
80G kW -484 + 468 - 1 6 - 5 5 7 - 4 6 2 -101S - 3 5 5 + 395 • 40 
OUT (-) 
IN (+) • JJ 
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Table 5. Summary of tests conducted during the fire-modeling test series. 
TEST SERIES 
CEL 1 43 kW/25C 1/s 
Methane gas through "H" burner with flow rate set at 160 
Fire strength calculated at 43kW 
CEL 2 50 kW/250 1/s 
Methane gas through "H" burner with flow rate set at 191 § 3B psig 30°C 
CEL 3 25 kW/250 1/s 
Methane gas through "H" burner with flow rate set at 93 8 14 psig (94 
later) 
CEL 4 50 kW/500 1/s 
Methane gas through "H" burner with flow rate set at 190 § 33 psig 26°C 
CEL 5 200 kW/250 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed in 3-ft-diameter pan at 250 ml/min 
15 on flowmeter 
CEL 6 400 kW/250 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed in 3-ft-diameter pan at 1040 ml/min 
33 on flowmeter 
CEL 7 200 kW/500 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed in 3-ft-diameter pan at 520 ml/min 
15 on flowmeter 
*No data on T/C Rek, no data on ducc O2 until last few seconds. 
First run with good CEL 0 2 data (missing "0" ring in detector) 
CEL 8 400 kW/500 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed in 3-ft-diameter pan at 1040 ml/tain 
33 on flowmeter 
CEL 9 800 kW/500 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed in 3-ft-diameter par at 2080 ml/min 
63 on flowmeter 
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Table 5. (Continued). 
CEL 10 and CEL 11 800 kW/250 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed in 3-ft-diameter pan at 2080 ml/min 
63 on flowmeter 
Moved 0 2 (cell) to 28 in. from center line of pan and 15 in. above floor 
•Reason for linking CEL 10 and CELL 11. Data acquisition stopped during 
CEL 10 restarted under CEL 11 on DKO. Later linked to a single file 
called CEL 10. 
CEL 12 Step 200, 400, 800 kW/500 1/s 
Isopropyl alcohol sprayed into 3-ft-diameter pan at 520 ml, 1040 ml, 
2080 ml/min 
15, 33 and 63 on flowmeter 
air flow at 500 1/s 
T/C at edge of pan was not in flame 
•Changed CH 19 Ceiling at CI (contact) 
CH 20 Ceiling at C6 
CH 21 Ceiling at B6 
CH 22 Flame temp in pan at nozzle 
CH 73 CH4 at center of pan at nozzle 
CEL 13 200, 400, 800 kW/500 1/s 
Methanol sprayed into 3-ft-diameter pan at 6983, 1386, 2772 ml/min 
21, 42, 84 on flowmeter 
Ait set at 500 1/s 
•Returned CH4 analyzer to duct stream 
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Table 6. Pertinent parameters of all tests conducted during the fire-modeling experimental series. 
Test 
1/3 2/1 3/2 4/4 5/5 6/121 7/131 8/6 9/8 10/12H 11/1311 IT./IO 13/9 L4/12III 15/13111 
C H 4 C H 4 C H 4 C H 4 C3 H8° W CH.O 4 C 3H 80 C3 H8° W CH4C W W c3 He° CH.O 250 250 250 soo 250 500 500 250 500 500 500 250 500 500 500 
250 250 245 465 245 445 440 230 440 420 430 230 405 W5 420 
65 + 125+ 130* 160+ 205 205 179 41b 415 415 354 830 830 830 750 
49 96 101 124 136 147 134 241 315 279 245 429 583 542 465 
0.78 0.78 0.78 0.7B 0.67 0.73 0-73 0.58 0-76 0.67 0.70 0.52 0,70 0.66 0.62 
80 115 130 1113 135 123 140 220 215 220 205 265 310 310 315 
50 50+ 60 65 60 65 70+ 90 110+ 115 105+ 120 195+ 195 195+ 
20 28 30 25 30 28 32 30 25 28 32 3? 30 28 32 
13 23 25 40 25 42 32 44 80 80 46 54 114 105 61 
36 73 76 84 111 105 104 197 235 199 199 375 469 439 403 
0.26 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.18 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.15 0,13 
0.21 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.1.2 0.21 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.06 
0.74 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.B2 0.71 0.76 0.82 0-75 0.71 0.81 0,87 0.80 0.81 0.B7 
0.37 0.58 0.58 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.57 0-47 0.57 0.48 0.56 0.45 0.S7 0.53 0.54 
+ Est imated 
Qe - po„ (T„ - T«.) with p c p - U / 1 0 K T u - T upper 
Co • s i n c e p * c o n s t . , Q c e i i • c o n s t . , and Qw • Q c - Q e Tm • T i n l e t 















Table 6. (Continued). 
Symbol Definition 
1. Test Experiments are listed in order of design combustion 
enthalpy, not chronologically. 
2. Fuel Self explanatory 
3. M,j (1/s) Uncorrected design pre-fire air flow rate. 
4. M a (1/s) Measured air flow rate at 480 s after fire start; corrected 
for temperature. 
5. Q c n (kW) [Mf • AHCJ measured fuel spray rate times 
literature heat of combustion* (theoretical heat release 
rate). 
6. Qcfc (kW) Heat release rate calculated from oxygen depletion at 480 s 
post fire start. 
7. SjA/Qcn Ratio of theoretical to calculated heat release rate (a 
chemical partition?) 
8. T u (°C) Bulk temperature of upper (hot) zone. 
9. T L (°C) Bulk temperature of lower (cold) zone. 
10. To, (°C) Ambient temperature 
11. Qg (kW) Enthalpy leaving enclosure in exhaust gases. 
(pCp tTu-Too)) estimate pCp U/l °K 
12. Q^ (kW) Enthalpy lost to enclosure walls and ceiling. 
Qy = (Qcfi-Qg)! since P = const., Q cell - const. 
13. Qe/CfcA Fraction of combustion enthalpy leaving enclosure in 
exhaust gases - (HRR by O2 depletion). 
14. Qe/Qcn Fraction of combustion enthalpy leaving enclosure in 
exhaust gases - (HRR by Mf • AH,,) . 
15. Qv/QcA Fraction of combustion enthalpy absorbed in walls (HRR by 
0 2 depletion). 
16. Qt//Qcn Fraction of combustion enthalpy absorbed in walls - (HRR by 
M f A H c ) . 
1 W. J. Parker, hn Investigation of the Fire Environment in an ASTM E-84 
Tunnel Test, HBS Tech. Note 945 (Aug. 1977). 
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Tanle 7. Compilation of two-layer calculations for the range of fire strength 










i height (m) 
5 points around time-
averaged 
layer height (n) 
2 500 59 127 1.11 1.08 
3 485 31 74 1.17 1.17 
4 500 41 107 1.21 1.21 
5 625 65 133 1.07 1.05 
,; 600 109 219 1.00 .97 
8 600 91 209 1.08 1.05 
9 490 137 318 1.0S 1.00 
500 156 317 1.35 1.33 
0 600 140 262 1.07 1.04 
605 148 267 1.29 1.29 
.2A 550 55 130 1.15 1.14 
2B 1050 94 213 1.0? 1.09 
2C 1475 146 300 1.05 1.05 
1480 160 311 1.29 1.29 
3A 400 58 137 1.16 1.14 
3B 825 85 199 1.07 1.08 
3C 950 122 302 1.02 1.05 
955 136 310 1.27 1.28 
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Table 8. Corrected test data and fire-spread model predictions. 
Test 
1/3 2/1 3/2 4/4 5/5 6/121 7/131 8/6 9/8 10/1211 11/1311 12/10 13/9 14/12111 15/13111 
kw (est) 25 50 50 100 200 200 200 400 400 400 400 800 800 800 800 
Exit Air (est) 250 250 250 500 250 500 500 250 500 500 500 250 500 500 500 
kW (exp) 65 125 130 160 205 205 179 415 415 415 254 830 830 830 750 
Exit Air (exp) 250 250 245 465 245 445 440 230 440 420 420 230 405 375 420 
Experiment TtJ 74 - 127 107 133 130 137 219 209 213 199 262 318 300 302 
TL 31 - 59 41 65 55 58 109 91 94 85 140 137 146 122 
HL 1.17 - 1.0S 1.21 1.05 1.14 1.14 .97 1.05 1.09 1.08 1.04 1.00 1.05 1.05 
Bolstad TU - - 78 56 157 - - 233 157 - - - - - -
HL - - 1.2 1.6 1.6 - - 2.0 2.2 - - - - - -
creighton Tu 60 - 183 111 627 - - 1270 681 - - - - - -
HL .8 - .6 .8 .5 - - .4 .25 - - - - - -
Krause T
D 
126 - 200 128 212 - - 280 212 - - 285 280 - -
HL 4.5 - 0 4.5 0 - - 1.6 0 - - 0 0 - -
Zukoski .1 - - 168 97 584 - - 1156 586 - - - - - -
Heat .25 - - 144 £fi 486 - - 977 496 - - - - - -
to T H .5 - - 102 67 327 - - 636 339 - - - - - -
Walls .7 - - 72 52 210 - - 393 216 - - 776 408 - -
.8 - - 57 43 144 - - 253 153 - - 516 280 - -
HL - " .7 1.4 .7 - - 1.4 1.4 - - .7 1.4 ~ " 
A H Temps in "Celsius 
Ty • Hot layer temperature 
T L •« Cool layer temperature 
Hr • Height of interface between hot and cool layer 
Table 9. Effect of heating rates on the degradation of various PVC 
formulations in acid ion production phase. 
Rate of Rate of Wt loss in dehydro- Terap of i n i t i a l Char 
heating degradation chlorination Region degradation residue 
Insulation ("C/min) (S/min) (») <°C] (») 
PVC-3 10 12.5 54 240 16 
(High power 20 13.7 54 240 16 
electr ical 
PVC-78 10 6.3 44 200 32 
(Appliance 20 8.3 46 60 33 
cable) 40 21 42 60 33 
PVC-95 10 8 56 210 38 
(Multi-strand 20 12.6 48 205 38 
siqnal cable) 40 27 49 80 38 
PVC-104 10 5.6 22 100 16 
(High voltage 20 10.6 22 60 16 




30 60 220 0 
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Table 10- Thermal degradation products for PVC cable #3. 
Plash ign i t ion Boil ing Water Extinguishing HFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATIOH 
Degradation products point (UC) temp. (°c) poin t (°C) so lub le method Health Flammability Reac t iv i ty 
Acid Ion Stage 
Pentadecene 
6-«e thy l -1-heptanol 
p h t h a l i c anhydride 152 570 284 No HO, Foam, Maybe 
benzoic acid 121 570 250 S l i g h t H 2 0, C0 2 , Dry Chem 
benxidine 400 Yes 
phenanthrene l ' / l 340 No H O-Foam 
n-bu ty l -o -ph tha la te 171 399 340 S l igh t CO -Dry Chem 
Post-Acid Ion Stage 
H 
Phenanthrene 171 340 No H O-Foam 







a. Chemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self contained breathing appacatue will protect against inhalation. 
b. Chemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
c. Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity to firemen. 





Table 11. Thermal degradation products for PVC cable #78. 
Degradation products 
Flash Igni t ion Boil ing Water 
point (°C) temp. (°C) poin t (°C) soluble 
Extinguishing 
method 
NFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Health Flammability Reac t iv i ty 
Acid Ion Staqe 
tridecanol 121 274 So H 20, Foam, Maybe 0 lc 0 
phthalic anhydride 152 570 284 So HJ3, Foam, Maybe 2b 0 
benzoic acid 121 570 250 Sl ight H^3, C0 2,Dry Chem 2 
phthalic acid 168 289 0a 0 
phenanthrene 171 340 No H-O-Foam 0 
2-methyl-pentanol 54 310 148 
Post 
No 

















In a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
Chemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self contained breathing apparatus will protect against inhalation. 
Chemical n>ust be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
Chenical must be moderately heated to ignite. 
Chemical is normally stable. 
Table 12. Thermal degradation products for PVC cable #104 (acid ion s t a g e ) . 
Degradation products 
Plash Ign i t ion Boil ing Water 
point (*C) temp. (*C) po in t (°C) so lub le 
Ext inguishing 
method 
WFPft HftZARD IDEHTIFICftTION 
Health Flammability Reac t iv i ty 
3-chlorodecane 


















a. in a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
b. Chemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
c. Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity hazard to firemen. 
Table 13. Thermal degradation products for PVC cable #104 (post-acid ion stage). 
Degradation products 
Flash Igni t ion Boil ing Hater 
point (°C) temp. (°C) poin t (°C) soluble 
Extinguishing 
method 
NFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 























a. In a fire condition! chemical would pose the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
b. Chemical is an identified carcinogen and should be avoided. 
c. Chemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
d. Chemical can be ignited under almost all normal temperature conditions. 
e. Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity hazard to firemen-
Table 14. Thermal degradation products for virgin PVC. 
Degradation products 
Flash ign i t i on Boil ing Water 
point (°C) temp. (°C) po in t (°C) so lub le 
Extinguishing 
method 
HFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 





d ioc ty lph tha l a t e 215 
300 
340 









Post-Acid Ion Stage 
H O-Foam, Maybe 
In a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
Chemical must be preheated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity hazard to firemen. 
Table 15. Effect of heating rates on thermal degradation of dehydrochlorination region in rubber 
insulations. 
Temperature leading to 
Insolation Rate of heating Rate of degradation Wt loss in dehydrochlorination initial degradation Char residue 
(°C/min) (%/min) region (ft) CC) (ft) 
Neoprene-118 
(Multiconductor 



















(Welding cable) 20 
40 
Neoprene-435 10 
(High v o l t a g e , high 
































Rubber 134 10 







Table 16, Thermal degradation products generated during and post-dehydrohalogenation region of neoprene 
cable #007 heated in air at 20°C/min. 
Degradation products 
Plash Ignition Boiling Hater Extinguishing 
point (°C) temp. (°C) point (0C) soluble method 
HFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 





2.- 3' -dime thylbiphenyl 
triacontane 
nor-pentacosane 






Acid Ion Stage 
2 8 ? NO 
450 NO 
H,,0 or F-an, Maybe 
395 NO 













Ho H 2 0 or Foam, haybe 
No H-0 or Foam, Haybe 
In a fire condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
Chemical must be preheatrd t<- ignite. Water may cause frothing if It gets below the surface of the liquid and turns tr, 
«tcam. 
Chemical must be noderately heated to Ignite. 
Chemicai Is nornally stable. 
Table 17. Thermal degradation products generated during and post-dehydrohalogenation region of neoprene 
cable #118 heated in air at 20°C/min. 
Flash ign i t i on Boil ing Water Extinguishing NFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Degradation products poinr (°C) temp. {DC) poir.t (°C) so lub :? method Health Flanunability R e a c t i - i t y 
Acid Ion Stage 
1,3-dimethylnaphthalene 
b i s - t r i c h l o r o e t h y l carbonate 
l , 4 -d ime thy l -5 -N-ac ty l -
naphtoalene 
l -n -bu ty l -2 -cyc lohexy l 
cyclohexane 
c i s - 9 - o c t a d e c e n - l - o l 
1-alJ ylnaphthalene 
l , l , 5 , E - t e t r a n i e t h y l -
2 f 3 ' -d imethylb ip^ , ;ny l 
10 2-hexadecycloethanol 
2,4-dinethoxybenzaldehyde No 
3#4,5 ,G-diphenylene- l -
oxo-cycloheptane 
2 , 6 - d i i s o p r o p y l - l -
chlorobenzene 
2 ,6 ,10 ,14 ,19-pen ta -
methyleicosane 
anthracene 121 540 340 Mo H _ 0 , Foam, CO, 0a l b 
4-methylfluorene 
1-inethoxy phenazine 
d iphenyle thyle^e 




Table 17. (Continued). 
Flash Ign i t ion Boil ing Water Ext inguishing NFFA HAZARD IDEHTIFICATIOH 
Degradation products point (*C) temp. (°C) poin t (°C) so lub le .iiethod Health Flammability Reac t iv i ty 
Post-Acid Ion Stage 
n-dot r iaeontane 310 
nonacosanol 






diiaobutylphthalate 185 432 327 No Alcohol Foam 0a lb 0c 
1,l-dichloro-2,2-bis 






2 ,6 ,10 ,15 - t e t r ame thy l 
heptadecane 
3 ,4-dichlorophenyl phenyl 
e ther 
butyl (butoxycarbonyl) 
methyl ph tha la te 
2-chloromethylheptane 
2 , 4 , 5 , 7 - t e t r a m e t h y l -
phenantrene 
dioctylphthalate 215 390 No H_0 or Foam, Kdybe 0 1 0 
a. In a fite condition, chemical would pose the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material* 
b. Chemical must be preheated to ignite. 
c. Chemical is normally stable and therefore foes not present any reactivity hazard to firemen. 
Table 18. Thermal degradation products generated during and post-dehydrohalogenation region of 
neoprene cable #84 heated in air at 20°C/min. 
F l a s h I g n i t i o n B o i l i n g Water E x t i n g u i s h i n g 
D e g r a d a t i o n p r o d u c t s p o i n t (°C) temp. (°C) p o i n t ("C) s o l u b l e method 
HFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
H e a l t h F \ ; , m m a b i l i t y R e a c t i v i t y 























phthalic acid 168 
dioctylphthalate 215 390 
diisobutyl phthalate 185 432 
H O or Foam, Maybe 
295 Slight Alcohol Foam 
270 No 




H-0 or Foamr Maybe 
Alcohol Foam 
a. In a fire condition chemical poses the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
b. Chemical is only slightly hazardous to firemen. 
c. Chemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self-contained breathing apparatus will prevent inhalation. 
d. Chemical must be i>r--.heated to ignite. Water may cause frothing f it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to steam. 
e. Chemical must be moderately heated to ignite. 
f. Chemical can be ignited under almost all normal temperaturt conations. Water may not extirguieh the fire because of the 
chemical's low flash point. 
g. Chemical is normally stable. 
h. Chemicals which are normally stable may become unstable in combination with other chemicals or at elevated tenperatures and 
pressures. Normal precautions in approaching any Eire should suffice. 
Table 19. Thermal degradaV.ion products generated during and post-dehydrohalogenation region ct" 
neoprene *-*ble #435 heated in air at 20°C/irin. 
Flash ignition Boiling Water Extinguishing MFPfl. HMRTO IDENTi.gICM?ION 
Degradation products point (°CJ temp. (°C) point (°C) soluble method Health Flanunability Reactivity 
Acid ion Stage 
Acenaphthene 279 No lb 1 




2,3 f t-dinethyl biphenyl 
cyclopiazonic acid 270 No 
anthracene 121 540 340 No HO, Foam, CO Oa Id 
n-hexa t r icontane 
methylphenanthrene 
Post-Acid Ion Staqp 
O 2-2' methylenebis (4-methyl-
h~" 6- ter t -butyl phenol) 
3,3,4,5,5,8-hexaraethyl-l-5-
hydrindacenon 
l , 6 , 8 - t r i n w t h y l - l , 2 , 3 , 4 -
tetrahydronaphthalene 
n-hexadecane MOO 202 287 No 0 1 0 
1,1,9-trlchloronon-l-ene 
triacontane 450 No 







dloctylphthalate 215 390 No H-0 ot Foam, Maybe 0 1 0 
a. In a fiee condition chemical poses the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
b. Chemical is only slightly hazardous '̂ o firemen. 
c. Chemical is hazardous when inhaled, but self-contained breathing apparatus will prevent inhalation. 
d. Chemical must be prehaated to ignite. Water may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
e. Chemical is normally utable. 
Table 20. Thermal degradation products generated during and post-dehydrohaiogenation region of 
polychloroprene cable heated in air at 20°C/min. 
D e g r a d a t i o n p r o d u c t s 
F l a s h I g n i t i o n B o i l i n g Wate r E x t i n g u i s h i n g 
p o i n t (°C) temp. (°C) p o i n t (°c) s o l u b l e method 
HFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
H e a l t h F l a m m a b i l i t y R e a c t i v i t y 
Acid Ion Stage 
2,3,4,5- tetramethyl-
hexa- 1 ,4-diene 
3,benzylidene-1,4,4-




3 ,3 ,5 ,5- te t ramethyl- l ,7 ,S-














di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 215 
pyrene 
Mo H-0 or Foam, Maybe 
Posf.-Acid Ion Stage 
231 
393 
HO, Foam, Haybe 
a. In a fire condition chemical poses the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible material. 
b. Chemical must be preheated to ionite. Hater may cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
steam. 
c. Chemical is normally stable and therefore does not present any reactivity hazard to firemen. 
Table 21. Thermal degradation products generated during and post-dehydrohalcgenation region of 
rubber cable #134 heated in air at 20*C/rain. 
Degradation products 
2-me thy1-4-hyd roxy-
pentanic acid Lactone 
n-nonyl alcohol 
2,5-dimethylhexene-l 
















diiso octal phthalate 
Flash Ignition Boiling Water 
point (°C) temp. (°C) point (°C) soluble 
Extinguishing 
method 
NFPA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 








Acid Ion Stage 
Alcohol Foam 
284 No H.O o r Foam, Maybe 
250 S l i g h t H 2° ' C°2' d r y C h m 
340 No HjO-Foam 
P o s t - A c i d Ion S t a g e 
180 YPS 
284 No H O o r Foam* Maybe 





H O or Foam/ Maybe 
H O o r Foam, Maybe 
a. In a f i re condition chemical poses the same health hazard as an ordinary combustible mate' ' '*' , . 
b. Chemical i s only s l igh t ly hazardous to firemen. 
c . Chemical i s hazardous when inhaled, but self-contained breathing apparatus wil l prevent Inhalation. 
d. Chemical must be preheated to Ign i t e . Water may cause frothing if i t gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to 
Steam. 
e- Chemical muot be moderately heated to igni te , 
f. Chemical i s normally s table . 
APPENDIX A 
A-l 
EXPERIMENTAL FUSION FACILITY 




Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 




PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Over the last two years an objective of this effort has been the develop­
ment of a risk analysis protocol for fire risk evaluation at experimental 
fusion facilities, built and operated by DOE at its member laboratories. 
Typically, when identifying the specific nature of fire risk at these 
facilities, we chose to assess these risks relative to the fusion program 
at each facility on an individual experiment, on a Division or Department 
level, and ultimately at the DOE level. 
1 2 Unlike industrial or commercial settings, ' fire risk requires slightly 
different ground rules. In research, moneys are made available to buy 
information in a timely manner as opposed to an industrial setting where 
fire risk assessments are made with regard to some uncertain impact on 
profit. With experimental fusion facility risk assessments we chose to 
reference or measure fire risks relative to their impacts on program 
schedules and budgets in the form of delays and marginal budget increases 
due to potential fire-related damage. 
During the development of this effort we have had to integrate a number of 
different views of fire protection objectives. Foremost amongst these 
views are those oriented towards building fire protection and fire 
protection based upon threats to operational availability of critical 
system hardware and equipment for any given experiment. A more useful 
picture of program uncertainty is allowed for by using both perspectives 
G. Ramachandran, Statistical Methods in Risk Evaluation, International 
Symposium on Fire Risk Evaluation 1979, ISBN 91-7144-138-7. 
C.L. Farmer, A Probabilistic Risk Analysis Technique with applications 
to enclosure fires, International Symposium on Fire Risk Evaluation 
1979, ISBN 91-7144-138-7. 
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PART I. GENERAL DISCUSSION (Continued) 
in assessing fire damage risk and by identifying the uncertainty associated 
with various aspects of fire safe facility design and operation. 
During previous efforts at formulating and applying a fire loss assessment, 
the following steps were undertaken to provide a consistent basis for 
ascertaining various levels of fusion experiment fire protection. This 
required the following steps: 
• Defining the potential hazard and magnitude of fire in 
each critical zone, compartment, or area. 
• Assessing the reliability and effectiveness of the fire 
protection system. 
• Evaluating the interaction of the above two efforts to 
estimate the amount of damage to each area. 
This update restates our previous findings for the Shiva Experiment and, 
together with a more critical review of operations, considers fire loss in 
terms of possible impacts on the experiment's programmatic budget and 
schedule. It is at the facility level that fire risk estimates should be 
made consistent with resident fire protection equipment, appropriate 
facility design criteria, contingency planning efforts, and budget and 
schedule objectives. The results of this brief study for Shiva should be 
useful to Novette and Nova operations personnel, as well as operations 
managers of other high cost, complex, multi-year and multi-objective 
experiments. 
The next section presents a general discussion of the methodology and 
extension to our risk analysis procedure. The second section provides an 
analysis of the Shiva facility at LLNL. The last section consists of 
general comments. 
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PART II. GENERAL PROCEDURE 
Because of budget and time constraints associated with this effort, a 
generalized assessment orotocol needed to be developed. The assessment 
methodology needed to be both flexible and detailed enough so as to capture 
different important aspects of fire protection structure and intent at 
DOE's member laboratories participating in fusion experiments. The 
flexibility in detail was necessitated by our intent to perform a risk 
analysis exercise and to examine the possible impacts on three different 
levels of management. 
Figure 2-1 is a logic diagram defining the general flow of our analysis. 
The assessment consists of two major parts. The first of these seeks to 
determine the specific location of facility vulnerability, the basis of 
which can be determined by general design criteria or by a recognition of 
high "value" equipment. Besides these previous criteria, the criterion 
"system operational availability" should be considered, since fire-related 
damage can be measured by its impact on system availability and cost. 
1ne next major part consists of three separate but important views of the 
facility and the corresponding research program. Given information 
designating "critical" compartments within an experimental facility, the 
specific availability of fire detection and suppression equipment can be 
estimated using simple comparison and/or detailed fault tree analysis. The 
second aspect of these selected critical compartments is ':he issue of fuel 
load, both resident and transient etc. which effect fire growth. Given 
that critical equipment is vulnerable to external fires, and that the loss 
system capability is an issue, ignition and fire growth studies are 
necessitated in order to quantify the extent of possible damage. These 
evaluations would include the interaction of fire suppression and detection 
equipment resident in the building. The importance of the potential fire 
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EXPERIMENTAL FUSION FACILITY FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM SURVEY 
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ORIENTED TOWARDS CRITICAL 
OPERATIONAL COMPARTMENT 
EXPERIMENTAL OPERATIONS DAMAGE ASSESSMENT SURVEY 
PART II. GENERAL PROCEDURE (Continued) 
hazard in each compartment/building location is measured by its impact on 
the way the experiment is continued and by the amount of moneys paying for 
its continuation. 
In order to derive information in tĥ -se three areas a series of surveys are 
required. The first survey is directed at fire safety specialists and 
seeks information about the fire protection system and 'bout fuel loads, 
etc. which effect fire growth. The second survey is directed at the 
operations manager/officer of the facility in question. The information 
sought by the second questionnaire relates to the costs in time and dollars 
of fire damage equipment and hardware essential to the operation of the 
system. 
Figures 2-2 through 2-5 briefly delineate the tasks, their inputs, outputs 
and techniques associated with each level of analysis. 
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figure 2-2. LEVFL I INVESTIGATION 
STEPS 
1. Decide upnn criticality of specific pieces 
of equipment: 
(a) Program delay 
(b) Highly vulnerable 
2. Select pertinent zones. 
3. Examine entire fire protection system. 
4. Construct fire protection system input/ou+put 
diagram for zones with critical experiments. 
Importance - equipment. 
5. Examine pertinent parameters for each zone: 
(a) Ignition 
(t) Ventilation/wall penetrations, etc. 
(c) Accessability (time) 
6. Draw control loop for specific area/zone in 
question and assign PDF's for failure of protec­
tion equipment, magnitude of response, response 
time, response effectiveness. 
DERIVE DATA FROM 
1. Program CPM chart, consider equipment 
required in critical path other resources 
as well. 
2. Plant engineering drawings. 
3. Questionnaire to: 
(a) Plant engineer 
(b) Operations engineer 
(c) Fire marshal/engineer 
4. Information derived from data Items 1, 2, 
and 3. 
5. Questionnaire(s): 
(a) Site specific question 
(b) Fire hazards analysis 
5. Derive information from data Items 4 and 5 




7. Consider dynamics of fire for specific area/zone 
investigated. 
8. Construct a series discrete damage functions 
(PDF's) as a f(p,t), etc., or assume a series 
of uniform distribution: 
(a) Construct a series for time delay 
(b) Construct a series for time and damage 
9. Make qualitative observations. 
10. Run the model(s): 
• Use method of moments 
• Use Monte Carlo methods 
• Use statistical inference methods 
11. Go to next critical area/zone (Steps 1 - 10). 
12. Perform CPM analysis for expected impact on a 
site/experiment basis. 
13. Iterate if necessary. 
M . Compare with program budget constraints and 
milestones. 
15. Make specific observations and suggest imple-
mentable solutions. 
LEVEL I INVESTIGATION 
DERIVE DATA FROM 
7. Fire modeling. 
8. Annual budget report: 
• Cost of line items 
• Replaceability of unique equipment 
t Delphi - opinion 
12. Level I Questionnaire. 
Figure 2-4 
_SI£P5 
', Level I investigation for all experiments separated 
by distance. 
2. Derive from CPM chart importance of time delay/ 
increased funding requirements - consider program 
slack and depth of supporting resources. This 
includes contingency funds available from within 
the contracting laboratory. 
Also consider the possibility of other programs 
which use the same equipment. 
3. Perform CPH analysis for expected impact on a 
lab basis. 
4. Iterate if necessary. 
5. Compire with program budget constraints and 
milestones. 
6. Make specific observations and suggest 
implementable solutions. 
LEVEL II INVESTIGATION 
1. Questionnaire directed at programmatic 
people. 
2. Level II - Questionnaire. 
3. Questionnaire. 
4. Cooperation of management. 
Figure 2-5. 
STEPS 
1. Level II investigation(s) for all laboratories 
with specific development work (state of art). 
2. Derive from CPM chart the importance of time 
delay and increased funding requirements: 
• Contingency funds 
• Agency-wide and_program-wide 
contingency 7unds 
3. Perforin CPM analysis for expected impact on 
DOE fusion program. 
4. Iterate if necessary. 
5. Compare with budget constraints and resolve 
to meet milestones. 
6. Make specific observations and suggest imple-
mentable solutions. 
LEVEL III INVESTIGATION 
DERIVE DATA FROM 
1. Questions directed at programmatic people 
as well as policy makers. 
2. Level III - Questionnaire. 
PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIFIC APPLICATION 
Recently completed applications of our fire risk assessment, which included 
the Shiva facility, were performed with the concept of a generalized fire 
in selected "critical" compartments. The simplifying assumption made 
during this previous effort was that if fire were prevented or 
significantly mitigated in a compartment, extensive fire losses resulting 
from equipment damage would correspondingly be minimized. In a number of 
compartments throughout the Shiva building, this approach provided an 
adequate level of detail, particularly in situations where critical system 
equipment was: 
• Predominantly threatened by external fire damage; or 
• where equipment was sufficiently hardened against damage from 
combustion products (e.g., soot, corrosive gases, aerosols, and 
heat). 
However, in other instances the high vulnerability of specific building 
equipment, mandatory for system operation, forced a review of our pro­
cedures and methods. Increased detail requirements in our analysis 
resulted from focusing on the issue of Shiva system operational avail­
ability. As before, this was also measured in terms of marginal increases 
and schedule delay in project costs resulting from potential fire-related 
damages. This approach seemed to make sense, given that both time and 
budgetary resources were not unlimited. Also, the fact that fire-related 
experiment schedule delays caused by equipment repair or outright 
replacement costs were not insignificant when compared to what seemed 
acceptable. 
It's significant to note that guaranteed high system availability generated 
more demands than the Shiva building's resident fire protection equipment 
alone could provide. However, when these facilities are initially 
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PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIFIC APPLICATION (Continued) 
constructed, they are designed and built relative to usage requirements 
which are guaranteed to be fixed. Additionally, they are designed and 
constructed in agreement with one of several standards written to protect 
buildings and life safety {e.g., ERDA Facility Design Criteria, Appendix 
6301; UBC Fire Code; and NFPA Guidelines). 
Again, these standards, while necessary, ar<5 not entirely sufficient in 
themselves to guarantee high Shiva operational availability. 
From the standpoint of Shiva's current schedule, a severe fire would most 
lively not impact the Shiva program schedule, since the experiment schedule 
for Shiva is near a conclusion. However, a fire involving any of the 
critical equipment required for Novette and Nova (e.g., capacitors, power 
supplies, target diagnostic equipment, alignment control electronics, etc.) 
would impact the cost and schedule of those respective efforts. Loss of 
this equipment at the Shiva experiment would presumably only impact the 
life cycle cost of the Shiva effort by way of reduced salvage value. 
However, in the case of special reusable equipment and hardware, fire loss 
may potentially be represented by replacement costs instead of their 
salvage value. Again, the impact on "near to end" Shiva program costs may 
be minimal, but the impact on the entire LLNL ICF effort may prove another 
matter. 
In contrast, the impace of these potential losses may not be significant to 
the question of commercial electric generation via fusion, since recent 
experimental results have tended to favor alternative magnetic fusion 
approaches. In spite of this, potentially reduced funding caused by 
significant fire-related capital losses and long schedule delays does not 
seem likely since driver development and target interaction physics have 
important military applications. 
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PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIFIC APPLICATION (Continued) 
If the same scenario involving the fire losses of critical operation 
equipment and hardware were to have occurred during the latter part of 
1978, cost and schedule impacts on this Shiva program would certainly be 
more pronounced, delaying 1979's high density experiments, 1980's scaling 
experiments, and so on. 
The accompanying Figure 3-1 illustrates a simplified representation of 
equipr „ and hardware essential to Shiva system availability. Critical 
amongst these are: 
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ESSENTIAL SHIVA SYSTEM AND HARDWARE AND EQUIPMENT SUBSYSTEMS 
Control room 
Special electronics 
• Programmable switch 
• Switch panels 
• PDP11/34 rs& i i /70 
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PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIFIC APPLICATION (Continued) 
• Power handling equipment 
• transformers 
• power supplies 
• capacitors 
• Safety interlock 
• Laser optics and electronics in the laser bay 
• pre-amplifiers and amplifiers 
• oscillator 
• optics 
• Environmental control for laser bay 
• fans 
• chillers 
• Target optics and electronics 
• target diagnostic electronics (switch panels, DAS) 
• optics 
• vacuum pump system 
• alignment computers 
• Special electronics in the control room 
• programmable switches 
• switch panels 
• computers 
• Control room environmental control 
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PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIAL APPLICATION (Continued) 
As indicated by the Figure 3-1, all these subsystems need to be operational 
for the facility to be fully operational. However, driver experiments can 
be conducted without the full use of the target room equipment. The 
results from previous efforts pointed out the vulnerability of the laser 
power cables and their through-floor penetrations and suggested that system 
optics were vulnerable to corrosion from combustion products. However, 
upon review this seems to be more approriate to the target rocn optical 
system since the laser train optics is protected by a nitrogen blanketing 
system. It's also interesting to note that the sprinkler system in these 
compartments is less than optimally located for early suppression. Less 
than optimal sprinkler head location is also a problem in the capacitor 
bank room. Sprinkler system spray may not be able to reach the necessary 
portions of the capacitor racks given a fire. 
Appendix A is included summarizing a brief survey for various critical 
Shiva operational subsystems together with their potential dollar and 
schedule delay impacts given severe fire damage. Presumably if fire damage 
is minor, the schedule and cost impacts will be minimal. To some extent, 
adverse effects are prevented by some built-in system redundancy, (e.g., 
computers), and via a spares' inventory (e.g., capacitors and amplifier 
rods). In the case of Shiva spare capacitors kept in the same compartment 
with in-service units, this may defeat any advantages afforded by spares, 
given a severe capacitor bank fire. The risk of a major fire would likely 
be traded off against the convenience of nearby replacements. 
As indicated earlier, Shiva system environmental control is essential to 
the operation of the system for driver and target experiments by virtue of 
its role in the laser alignment problem and clean room maintenance for the 
target bay, laser bay, control room, and the clean room. 
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PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIAL APPLICATION (Continued) 
To date our review has avoided addressing the vulnerability of the target 
fabrication activity and equipment to fire damage. Although we have not 
addressed this point, it's easy to see that target experiments would suffer 
a delay, given that targets needed to be manufactured somewhere else, or 
given the target fabrication equipment needed to be extensively repaired or 
replaced. Again, driver-related experiments could be rescheduled to 
compensate for any lost time. 
Figure 3-Z is a map of critical compartments within Shiva's building 391. 
The darker shaded area represents those compartments which were previously 
considered critical areas/compartments selected for examination. The areas 
shown by the lighter shading represent those additional areas containing 
equipment previously mentioned, listed in Appendix A, and judged essential 
to Shiva system "Operational Availability". 
Specific equipment not protected against internal fires includes: 
o control room electronic switch panels and programmable 
switches; 
o safety interlocks (internal fires caused by overheating, 
power surges, shorting, etc.); 
o target diagnostic equipment (internal fires); 
o vacuum pump subsystem; 
o power supplies; 
o oscillator and amplifier electronics; and 
o environmental control systems for the laser bay, target 
bay and control room. 
A-19 
PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIAL APPLICATION (Continued) 
In some cases (i.e., the last two) specific fire suppression equipment is 
not absolutely necessary by virtue of the absence of combustible fuel. The 
remaining items, however, possess ignition sources, fuel, high operational 
value, and are not directly provided with fire suppression devices. Hence, 
even though the general Shiva building fire protection system has a high 
general availability,* protection may not be adequate to guarantee a high 
measure of confidence against "severe" fire damage losses. 
In other cases, fire damage probabilities may be relatively lower, by as 
much as an order of magnitude; yet because the fire damage consequences, 
measured either in time or dollars, are extremely high, the net risk may be 
worthy of concern. The concern might result in: 
o a redesign or specification; 
o a sparing policy; 
o a contingency plan; or 
o more comprehensive maintenance and inspection requirements. 
The specific approach should be prescribed on the basis of its cost 
effectiveness. Examples of fire risks of this nature are represented by: 
o transformer fire; 
o capacitor bank fires; and 
o target diagnostic electronic equipment. 
*"Fire Protection Research for Energy Technology," FY 1980 Year-End Report, 
May 26, 1981, UCRL-53179; and "Fire Protection Research for Energy 
Technology Projects," FY 1979 Year-End Report, January 1981. UCID-18902. 
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Plan view - 1st floor 
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PART III. SHIVA: A SPECIAL APPLICATION (Continued) 
There are a few cases where it is doubtful that fire protection/suppression 
will be effective in preventing fire damage. Specifically, the high 
expansion foam subsystem, originally specified and installed to protect the 
target bay, represents a subsystem which would be effective only after 
major damage to optics and electronic equipment has occurred because of 
operations personne1 reluctance to use the system, its manual operation 
mode, and the cleaning effort required when it is used. Secondly, it is 
considered doubtful that the overhead sprinklers in the target and laser 
bays will be effective in preventing any ma;or damage to system equipment. 
Damage is expected to occur early in the life of a fire. 
By and large, the fire-related risks to the Shiva system are easily 
manageable or low to begin with. This is owed the minimization of the 
transient fuel load in the facility and to the clean room requirements of 
several essential areas. Two specific items deserve re-mentioning. First, 
there is a vulnerability in the power cables for the laser train. Second, 
the vulnerability of specially constructed electronic centers throughout 
the Shiva system could be specifically provided with both internal ic,iition 
design protection and individual fire suppression, since entire redundant 
units are not normally feasible. 
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PART IV. GENERAL COMMENTS 
The general comments included in this section include two topics. The 
first comments on the evaluation of consequences. The second takes a 
broader view of program and risk analysis applications. 
The evaluation of fire d?mage consequences can be more accurate than for 
the associated probability, since the former may involve a more predic­
table set of outcomes or less uncertainty. It was found, for instance, 
that the consequences of fire damage can differ by several orders of 
magnitudes in dollars (e.g., 55.5M for an entire rack station of diag­
nostic electronic equipment and {IK for specific pieces of electronic and 
mechanical equipment. The same is true of delay time). In these cases the 
relative significance of two problems is much more dependent on their 
consequences than the expected probability of occurrence. Hence, the 
quantitative measure of risk becomes more accurate thin one might on the 
surface think. 
Design risk analysis is most effective at helping to reduce risk via design 
early in a program. Specifically, fire protection system design risk 
trade-off studies can be employed to reduce fire damage consequences and 
probabilities during the conceptual system design phase, thus helping to 
reduce 1ife cycle cost uncertainty. Further risk reduction can be achieved 
by testing and redesign as required during the development and test phases 
of a system like Shiva. 
In the case of Shiva, this fire risk analysis provides no direct benefit to 
the Shiva project itself. However, it can provide a benefit to subsequent 
ICF projects by providing an assessment of specific design situations which 
may be used. Secondly, the procedure is a method of presenting design/cost 
trade-offs for management decisions. 
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APPENDIX A. SHIVA OPERATIONS SURVEY FORM 
The following data was provided by knowledgeable operations personnel and 
represents our best state of current information as to the negative impacts 
on Shiva budget and schedule for fire-caused damages. More precise numbers 
for costs and schedule delay are recommended when doing a full analysis to 
support decisions for selecting or reviewing cost-effective fire 
protection. Penalty cost uncertainties can be estimated with the aid of 
the CPM chart analysis of recovery contingency plan along with equipment 
and hardv.are costs. Corresponding schedule delays can also be ascertained 
by analysis of this same CPM chart. 
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SHIVA OPERATIONS SURVEY FORM 
Given layout and elevation plans of the experiment building, we need to 
enumerate specific areas/compartments of the facility which figure 
significantly into the uninterrupted progress of the program schedule. 
The base assumption is that the experimental program only depends directly 
upon equipment availability. 
Direct and indirect fire damage mechanisms should be accounted for in this 
operational readiness survey. 
Direct Damage caused by combustion products and by fire 
o corrosive components 
o smoke (particulate) 
o heat (from external and internal sources) 
Indirectly caused by structural failure 
o in-building equipment structure(s) 





OPERATIONAL READINESS SURVEY FORM 
(Time/Days) 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 
CONTAINING STRATEGIC EQUIPMENT 
PROGRAMMATIC DFLAY 
(Cost 103 3) 
Cont ingency or 
Workaround 







1. Computers POP 11/34 & Programs 
„ PDP 11/70 
i 
" 2. Programmable Switches 
3. Switch Panels & Other Unique 
Electronic Assemblies 
4. Control Panels 
Replacement Cards 
• Backplane (Wire Wrapped) 
1 2 5 
3 5 10 
15 21 32 
0 0.2 1 
















1 . Air Conditioning 






• Smal l - Yes 
Minimal - Yes 
- Small - Yes 
L = LOW 
E* = Expected 
LASER BAY 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 
CONTAINING STRATEGIC EQUIPMENT 
D i rec t Damage 
1 . Optics 
2. Oscil lator Controls (Unique) 










Cont ingency or 
Workaround 
H Plan Y/N 
1 2 Yes 
22 30 No 
15 25 No 
REPLACEMENT COST 










-J Indirect Damage 




Very Long Very High No 
*Unknown to us at this time 
TARGET BAY 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 




• Alignment (Front End) 
Optics (Few) 
• Mirrors* 
• Photomultiplier Tuber 
• Cameras Special 
Vacuum Control Area 
• Vacuum Pumps 
• Electronics 
TABLE 3 
OPERATIONAL READINESS SURVEY FORM 
PROGRAMMATIC DELAY 
(Time/Days) 
15 22 33 
0 1 2 
0 1 2 
15 22 33 










1. Crane Overhead 
Very Long 
2. Ceiling & Roof 
NOTE: *0ptics not protected by a nitrogen blanket. 
No 
REPLACEMENT COST 
(Cost 103 3) 
Equip. Spares 
or Immediate 
L E H Deliv. Y/N 
10K 10K 20K No 
Unknown - Yes 
20K 25K Questionable 
Very High No 
TABLE 4 
OPERATIONAL READINESS SURVEY FORM 
HEATING, VENTILATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 




j, • Target Bay 
• 
" • Laser Bay 
PROGRAMMATIC DELAY 
(Time/Days) 
Depends upon extent 
of damage 
Same 
Cont ingency or 
Workaround 





(Cost 10 3 $) 
Equip. Spares 
or Immediate 




POWER HANDLING, CONDITIONING, 
AND STORAGE 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 
CONTAINING STRATEGIC EQUIPMENT 
TABLE 5 





H Plan Y/N 
Direct Damage 
1. Capacitor Room 
Capacitors 
Capacitor Load Module 
& Fork Lift 
0 Very Long None at Present 
0 Moderate Yes 
2. Power Supply Area 
• Power Supplies & Control 
Circuits 
0 Moderate Yes 
(Spare) 
3. Power Interlock Conditioning 
Unit 
1M** 2M** 3M** 
4. P.C. Board Tester Electronics 
Indirect Damage 
0 0 Unknown Yes 
1. Flooding 
2. Ceiling Failure 
30d* - - No 
Very Long - No 
NOTES: +Salvage Value of Capac i to rs 
*See Seismic Experience 
**M = Months 
REPLACEMENT COST 
(Cost 103 J ) 
Equip. Spares 
or Immediate 
D e l i v . Y/N 
2K 6M+ Yes(?) 
25K 30K 40K No 
- Small - Yes 
5K 20K No 
Labor Costs Hardware 
100K Yes 
Labor Cleanup Costs N.A. 
- Very Large - No 
TABLE 6 
OPERATIONAL READINESS SURVEY FORM 
TARGET DIAGNOSTICS AREA(S) 
(Outs ide Target Room) 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 
CONTAINING STRATEGIC EQUIPMENT 
D i r e c t Damage (Heat & Smoke) 
E l e c t r o n i c Racks 
£ E l e c t r o n i c Racks 
PROGRAMMATIC DELAY 
(Time/Days) 
Cont ingency or 
Workaround 
H Plan Y/N 
2M* m 6M 
REPLACEMENT COST 





10K 5.500K NO 
1 Mi l l ion Labor 




NOTE: *M = Months 
MISCELLANEOUS 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 




500 KEV/4 MVA 
TABLE 7 
OPERATIONAL READINESS SURVEY FORM 
PROGRAMMATIC DELAY 
(Time/Days) 














1. Minor Structural - None - Minor 
CLEAN ROOM 
STRATEGIC BUILDING COMPARTMENT 
CONTAINING STRATEGIC EQUIPMENT 
Direct Damage 
1. Freon Spray System 
2. Work Rack Fixtures 
Indirect Damage 
TABLE 8 








1. Heating, Ventilating and Air 
Conditioning Uncertain No 
REPLACEMENT COST 
(Cost 103 $) 
Equip. Spares 
or Immediate 
L E H Deliv. Y/N 




CALCULATIONAL PROCEDURES USED IN FIRE MODELING 
Data from July 1981 LLNL idealized fire tests has been subjected to 
balancing criteria to assess potential error sources in measurement and state 
reduction procedures. We grouped our criteria into seven pertinent parameters 
of interest (see Table 1): total mass flow (in g/s), major species flow (0-, 
N ), major products flow (H_0, CO ), minor products flow (CO, CH ), 
elemental balance (C, 0, H), energy flow (kilowatts) and combustion energy 
(kilowatts). An example set of these seven plots for CEL8 is included along 
with an explanation of balancing relationships, terms, symbols and assumptions 
(Table 2). The BASIC programs "FIDO," "FANG," and "ROVER" (The Dog Files) 
that performed calculations and plotted the daua can be found at the end of 
this appendix, along with some program notes that give detailed explanations 





Mass. = 1.176 (300) (Inlet Air .. + Inlet Air .. ) (1.03) 
(Temp. + 273) n o r t h s o u t h 
in 
/ \ /(Temp *) + 5 6 3 \ 
Mass = - [ 1 .176 (300) \ f Hepa \ (Exi t Air*) 
° V^Hepa* + 273); \ 662 / 
Mass = Mass. + Mass ,_ + Fuel, net in out in 
N . =0.76 (mass. ) 2in in 
N2out = °-"("" Bout " °2out " C°out " C H4out " C°2out " ( J 3 " ' C°2out )) 
N2net " N2in + N2out 
MAJOR SPECIES ° 2 i n = ° - 2 3 l a a S S i n i 
0 = 0 - 0 . 
2out 2net 2in 
0„ = - (Jl • C0 o ) + (J2 • CO J 2net 2net net 
H„0. =0.01 (mass. ) 2 in in 
MAJOR PRODUCTS 
H 2 ° o u t ( - 0 1 3 1 6 * H 2oat> + ( J 3 ' C °2out> 
HO = H„Oin 4 H„Oout 2 ne t 2 2 
CO. ,. = 1 .52 (% CO, ) • ( i B S S n i ) 2net 2 ou t 
100 
MINOR PRODUCTS 
CO _ = 0.966 (% CO ) • (mass I 
n e t Too o u t 





Carbon = (Zl • Fuel. ) + 12 (CO, J + 12 (CO J + 12 (CH, ) 
in 2net net 4net 
44 28 16 
** 
Hydrogen = (Z2 • Fuel. ) + 2 (HO ) + 4 (CH • 
in 2 net 4net 
18 16 
Oxygen = (Z3** • Fnel^) + (O,^) + 16 ( H ^ > + 32 ( 0 0 ^ ) + 16 (CO^) 18 44 28 
Mass = Fuel + 0 + (CO + CO + CH + H O ) in 2net 2net ,iet 4net 2 net 
Q. = 0.00102 (Temp. + 273) • (mass. ) in in in 
Q = 0.00109 (Temp ,_ + 273) • (mass ) 
Q = Q. + Q net in out 
Q (CO.+ CO) = VI • (Jl • CO„ + J2 • CO ) £ 2net net 
COMBUSTION ,„ % ,** 
ENERGY Q (°2> = VI • 0 2 n e f c 
QWall " " Qnet + Q ( C 0 2 + C 0 ) 
* Time delay/offset to account for transit down duct 
** Value depends on fuel used 
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r 8 D N2 INLET CD N2 OUTLET A N2 NET + 02 INLET X 02 OUTLET 
4S0 . . . . .•. P2 NET 
MRJOR SPECIES 
ISOPROPflNOL 






MO L/S ~1S KW 27 C 
Q HATER INLET 
O WATER OUTLET 
A WATER NET 
+ C02 OUTLET =C02 NET 





H O L/S 415 KW 27 C 
13 CO OUTLET »CO NET 
CD HYDROCflRBONS OUTLET 
A CO OUTLET /C02 OUTLET 
+ HYDROCflRBONS OUTLET / FUEL INLET 
100 200 300 tOO 
SECONDS 
500 600 "TBfl 
ELEMENT BHLflNCE 


















Explanation of Equations and Terms 
3 in 
Mass. 
Rate of mass coming in inlet duct (grams/sec). Assumes only the 
pure air enters this inlet duct. The density of inlet gases is 
found by correcting 1.176 (density of air at 300°K from CRC 
F-10) by the actual inlet temperature. The measured volume of 
gases in is corrected by a calibration wall drag factor 1.03. 
Value should be positive (=200-500 grams/sec). 
Rate of mass leaving exit duct (grams/sec). Assumes only 
vitiated air leaves duct. The density is corrected for 
temperature and the exit air flow is also correct for 
temperature. Value should be negative (=200-500 grams/sec). 
Net rate of mass in or out of room (grams/sec). Taken as the 
total of the masses in (mass^n plus m assj u e^) and mass out. 







Rate of Nitrogen gas coming in inlet duct (grams/sec). Taken as 
76% of the mass; Value should be positive (=150-350 
grams/sec). 
change. 
It is assumed all this exits the room without 
Rate of Nitrogen gas leaving exit duct (grams/sec). Calculated 
from the mass t minus all gas species besides nitrogen. 
Value should be ( =150-350 grams/sec). 
Net rate of nitrogen gas in or out of test cell (grams/sec). 
Taken as total of l&2Ln a n d N2ouf Value should be zero. 
Rate of oxygen gas coming in inlet duct (grams/sec). Taken as 
23* of the mass i n. Value should be positive (=50-100 
grams/sec). 
Rate of oxygen gas leaving the exit duct (grams/sec). Taken as 
°2net m i n u s °2in' Value should be negative. 
Net i-ate oxygen gas in or out of test cell (grams/sec). Also 
rate of Oj consumed by the fire. Calculated from C 0 2 n e t and 
C O n e t by multiplying each by a factor. Jl is the gm 0 2 
consumed per gm C0 2 produced for a particular fuel and J2 is 
the gm Q2 consumed per gm c 0 produced. Value should be 
positive. 
Rate of water vapor coming in inlet duct (grams/sec). Taken as 
also assumed that all of this exits the 
Value should be positive (=2-4 
11 of mass... It i in room without change, 
grams/sec). 
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H2°out R a t e o f w a t e r vapor leaving the exit duct (grams/sec). Since we 
assume that all H 2 0 i n goes out, H 2 0 o u ^ will equal 
H2°in P l u s t n e H 2 ° produced from the fire. We find 
H2°in knowing that N 2 £ n equals N 2 o u t and 1.316% of 
N2in i s e < 3 u a l t o t n e H2°in - V alue should be negative. 
H2°net N e t r a t e o f water vapor coming in or out of test cell 
(grams/sec). Also rate of H 20 produced by the fire. Taken as Value should be negative 
(=5-50 grams/sec). 
')2net N e t r a t e o f c 0 2 g a s Produced in test cell (grams/sec). The 
volumetric % C 0 2 o u t from to C0 2 analyzer is multiplied by 
1.52 (where MW of C0 2 = 44 and MW of air * 29 mass fraction of 
C0 2 in air) to get % mass C 0 2 o u t and this is multiplied by 
ma s s o u t to get C0 2 o u t ; which is equal to C 0 2 n e t when you 
assume CO 
grams/sec). 2in 
equal zero. Value should be negative (=2-50 
C0n Net rate of CO gas produced in test cell (grams/sec). The volumetric % CO Q t from to CO analyzer is multiplied by .97 
(mass fraction CO in air) to get % mass C 0 o u t and this is 
multiplied by m a s s o u t to get C 0 o u t ; which is equal to 
c onet w n e n y ° u assume CO^ n equal zero. Value should be 





Net rate of equivalent methane produced in test cell 
(grams/sec). The ppm "methane" from the flame ionization 
hydrocarbon analyzer is multiplied by 1 million and .55 (mass 
fraction of CH4 in vitiated air) to convert to * mass 
"methane" o u t. This is multiplied by mass o u t to get 
"methane" U£; which is equal to "methane" n e t when you assume 
"methane"^n equal zero. Value should be negative (=.01-2 
grams/sec). 
Carbon atom balance (grams/sec). Taken as the total of the mass 
fraction of the carbon containing species going in and out of 
the test cell. Zl is the mass fraction of carbon atoms in the 
fuel. Value should approach zero. 
Hydrogen atom balance (grams/sec). Taken as the total of the 
mass fraction of all hydrogen containing species going in and 
out of the test cell. Z2 is the mass fraction of the hydrogen 
atoms in the fuel. Value should approach zero. 
Oxygen atom balance (grams/sec) taken as the total of the mass 
fraction of all oxygen atom containing species going in or out 
of the test cell. Z3 is the mass fraction of the oxygen atoms 
in the fuel. Value should approach zero. 
Mass Balance Check (grams/sec). Taken as Puel i n minus the 
total of all the net gases. It is an indication of the soot or 
water entrapment or leaks in the system. Value should approach 
zero. 
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Q j n Gas Energy coming in inlet duct (KILOWATTS) .00102 is the heat 
capacity of pure air in joules/K° • gram. This multiplied by 
the inlet air temperature and the mass 
Value should be negative (=50-150 kw). 
Q Gas Energy leaving test cell exit vent (KILOWATTS). .00109 is 
the heat capacity of vitiated air in joules/K" • gram. This 
is multiplied by the exit air temperature and the mass of air 
out the outlet to get Q o u t . Value should be negative 
(=100-250 kw). 
Q n e t Net Gas Energy in or out of test cell via air ducts (KILOWATTS) 
taken as total of Q. n and 0 o u t . Value should be negative 
(=50-150 kw). 
Q(C02+CO) Heat release rate of fire (KILOWATTS) calculated from C0 2 and 
CO produced. VI is the KW released per gram of 0 2 consumed. 
Jl is the grams of 0 2 consumed per gm C 0 2 produced and J2 is 
the grams of 0 2 consumed per gm CO produced. Value should be 
equal to the heat release rate calculated from mass of fuel^n. 
Q(0 2) Heat release rate from fire (KILOWATTS) calculated from 0 2 
consumed which was calculated from CO2 and CO produced this 
calculation assumes all O, goes to CO-. Value should equal 
Q (C0 2 + CO) . 
Q W a l l Heat Loss to Walls (KILOWATTS) calculated from the heat release 
rate of the fire minus the net gas energy leaving the test cell. 
Value should be negative and =60%-80% of the fire strength. 
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THE DOG FILES 
Introduction 
The dog files were written by Ken Foote with Pat Pagni in September 1981 
to analyze data from the large-scale test cell calibration experiments. These 
programs will analyze data stored in virtual files on a hard disk from Fire 
Science's PDP-11 under the program EXPT.B99. The analysis includes equations 
to calculate mass balance, species balance, product balance, gas energy 
balance, element balance and combustion energy. 
The program sequence is FIDO to FANG to ROVER. FIDO retrieves stored 
data, FANG manipulates it and ROVER plots it. It is important to note that 
for certain tests the programs FIDO and FANG must be changed to correct for 
test conditions. 
A QUICK RUN THROUGH THE DOG FILES AND HOW-TO LESSON 
The dog files are three BASIC programs for manipulating data from LLNL's 
large scale compartment tests. The program sequence is started by running 
FIDO.B99 (see Table 3). FIDO asks several questions. The first of which is, 
"WHAT FILE DO YOU WANT?" You should type in the file name of the test data 
you wish to analyze. An appropriate response would be "DKliCELl" where "DK1:" 
is the device name the data is stored on and "CEL1" is the file name. The 
1981 tests were named CEL1-13. 
After asking you for a file to analyze, FIDO will ask you what fuel was 
used and the fuel flow rate. This information can be found on Tables 4 and 5. 
The program sets the values of the variables for the density, heat release and 
atomic composition according to which fuel you input. If you misspell a fuel 
or enter one that wasn't used, the error message, "ILLEGAL FUEL" will be 
printed and the program stopped. FIDO will analyze the whole test from start 
to finish. If you wish to look at only a part of a run changing the values of 
a and b in line 115 will enable you to do that. 
After clearing the screen, FIDO retrieves the raw data (the millivolt 
readings stored by EXPT.B99), converts them into engineering units and stores 
them in a large virtual file called PUPPY.D99 [VF1 (6000)]. This data is 
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stored sequentially. For example, data for channel 70 would be stored in 
addresses 1-500 and data for channel 71 would be stored in addresses 501-1000, 
and so on. There are 500 addresses allotted to each channel. Thus, the 
program can handle up to 500 data points or 2500 s of data if sampling is 
every 5 s. FIDO analyzes only 11 channels from EXPT: channels 6, 23, 31, 32, 
52, 53, 54, 70, 71, 72 and 73 (see Table 6). FIDO, however, has the capacity 
to access more and different channels with minor modifications. FIDO records 
the number of data points for each run in address zero of PUPPY for future 
reference, when all the data has been converted the counting stops, the 
screen is erased, PUPPY is closed and FIDO chains to FANG.B99. 
FANG opens PUPPY and using the data in it calculates various interesting 
statistics such as mass balance, species balance, product balance, gas energy 
balance, element balance and combustion energy for that test. Table 6 and 7 
will help you follow or change the manipulations. The new values are stored 
in a new virtual file called SNOOPY.D99 [VF2 (15000)]. Because J"ANG :'s slow 
in doing the manipulations, it counts the data so you can follow its 
progress, when FANG is completed it erases the screen, closes both PUPPY and 
SNOOPY and chains to ROVER.B99 to plot the data in SNOOPY. 
ROVER asks three main questions. The plot title, the curve numbers and 
the maximum value of the plot. The appropriate inputs for these questions are 
on Table 8. If you don't chain directly from FANG to ROVER (such as in a 
replot), Rover will ask for the file name and the fuel type again. This 
information is normally chained from FANG to ROVER automatically. 
After you input the max value, ROVER will print out the requested plot. 
Upon completion it copies the plot, clears the screen and returns to ask the 
main three questions again. ROVER will loop this way indefinitely. To exit 
the program press <CONTROL C> also lif you make a mistake press <CONTROL 
C> and RUN to start over. 
ROVER uses a string file called BONES.D99 [V5$ (40)]. This file contains 
the labels for the various curves. There is a program called NEWLBL.B99 (new 
labels) that will list and change the labels in BONES. 
For various tests it will be necessary to change FIDO or FANG to correct 
for errors in the test conditions. These two corrections are summarized on 
Table 9. First, it was discovered that the CO analyzer was poorly calibrated 
for the first 7 runs. So, there is a correction for that. Second, with tests 
where the exit air flow was approximately 500 1/min, it was decided to have e 
delay time of 20 s instead of 30 as in the 250 1/min tests. Thus, there is a 
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4 data point skip (4 X 5 s » 20 s) for the 500 1/min tests, instead of a 6 
data point skip (6 X 5 s « 30 s) as in the 250 1/min tests. To make this 
coriection easier there are two entire programs that can replace FANG with 
these corrections in them. FANG4 is a FANG with a 20-s delay and FAriG6 is a 
FANG with a 30-s delay. 
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TABLE 3 





NEWLBL .B99 (Optional) 
FANG 6 .B99 (Optional) 
FANG4 .B99 (Optional) 
DATA FILES 
PUPPY .D99 VF1 (6000) 
SNOOPY .D99 VF2 (15000) 














































160 x 2.214 » 354.2 
191 x 2.34 = 446.9 
94 x 1.92 = 180.5 


































VARIABLES FOR FIDO* 
C„H y° z 
0 
( g / c m 3 ) 
MW c 
M W F u e l 
MW „ 
MW P u e l 
HW Q 
ww F u e l 
KJ 
g n F u e l 
KJ 
g n 02 
919 O j 
gn C 0 2 gm CO 
g n H 2 0 
gra CQ 2 
" l e t h a n e ™4 . 6 6 4 7 0 . 7 5 0 . 2 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 1 2 . 5 1 . 4 5 1 . 7 1 . 8 1 8 
• 1 ° t h a u o l CH 4 0 . 7 B 7 . 3 7 3 . 1 2 5 D .5 2 0 . 0 1 3 . 3 1 . 0 9 1 . 1 4 . 8 1 8 
I s o p r o p a n o l c ) i e 0 . 7 B 1 0 . 6 . 1 3 3 . 2 6 7 3 0 . 5 1 2 . 7 1 . 0 9 1 .14 . 5 4 5 
mr 0 ( g / c i n 3 ) KJ KJ q n F u e l gm F u e l fjcl g * F u e l t co Z ) g n F u e l ( C O , g n 0 2 ( C O j , gm 0 2 | C 0 , 
M e t h a n e CH, . 6 6 * 7 50.1 3 3 7 . 5 0 . 2 5 0 . 3 3 
M e t h a n o l CH,0 . 7 6 7 2 0 . 0 1 3 . 3 1 . 6 7 1 . 0 0 
I s r - j p r a p a n o l CjHgO . 7 6 1 3 0 . ! 5 1 9 . 9 0 . 4 2 0 . 6 3 
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TABLE 6 
VARIABLES FOR FIDO 
FIDO VFl(PUPPY) 
p X 
Q = X + 500 
R = X + 1000 
g = X + 1500 
T = X + 2000 
JJ = X + 2500 
X + 3000 
X + 3500 
X + 4000 
2 = X + 4500 
20 
X = # of elements 
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TABLE 7 
VARIABLES FOR FANG 
FANG VF2(SNOOPY) 
= Ml = 1 
= M2 = I + 500 
= M3 = I + 1000 
= Nl = I + 1500 
= N2 = I + 2000 
= N3 = I + 2500 
= 0 1 = I + 3000 
= 0 2 = I + 3500 
= 0 3 = I + 4000 
= Wl = I + 4500 
= W2 = I + 5000 
= W3 = I + 5500 
CO outlet = CO net = D2 = D3 = I + 6000 
CO outlet = CO net = C2 = C3 = I + 6500 
Hydrocarbons outlet = H2 = H3 = r + 7000 
CO outlet/CO outlet = CO = r + 7500 
Hydrocarbons/Fuel in = FO = I + 8000 
Carbon = C8 = I - P.50 0 
Hydrogen = H8 = I + 9000 
Mass = M8 = I + 1500 
Oxygen = 0 8 = I + 10000 
Q inlet = 0.1 = I + 10500 
Q outlet = Q2 = I + 11000 
Q net = Q3 = I + 11500 
Q (CO + CO ) = 0.4 = 1 + 12000 
Q (O ) = Q5 = I + 12500 











H O inlet 
H 2 C ) outlet 
H 2C ) net 
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TABLE 8 




























Prog ram Line Change 
Offset for uncalibrated CO 
FIDO 633 v = V + .019 (for runs 1-6) 
delete (for runs 8-13) 
Time delay for inlet-exih time 
PANG 3140,3160,3180 + 4 (for 500 liter/min exit) 
replace with FANG4 
+ 6 (for 250 liter/min exit) 
replace with FANG6 
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FIDO 12-N0U-S1 MU BASIC-RT-11 uei-01D 
1 REM FID0.B99 URITTEN 10,-81 BV KEN FOOTE AS PART OF THE DOG FILES 
c REM TO READ EXPT.B99 UFILES 
ae cow.or- FI,FS,UI,ZI,Z2,Z3,J:,J2,J3,F*,P« 
30 Din C;iii 
50 PRINT CHR«iS7 -,CHR»'. 12) 
18© PRINT 'WHAT FILE DO YOU UANT <EX.CEL8)"j \ INPUT P» 
105 PRINT "UHAT MAS THE FUEL USED"; s INPUT F* 
115 A-G v B-99999 \ REM CAN REPLACE THIS UITH INPUTS FOR AiB 
12© PRINT "ENTER THE FUEL FLOU (MLTIIN)"; v INPUT F 
125 IF FSO"METHANE" THEN 150 
130 D-.6647 s Kl-50 \ Ul-12.5 
135 21-.75 v 22-.25 s Z3-0 
140 J1-1.4S N J2-1.71 \ J3-.818 N GO TO 200 
150 IF FSO "METHANOL" THEN 175 
155 D-.787 \ Kl-20 \ Ul-13.3 
160 21-.375 \ Z2-.125 \ Z3-.5 
165 Jl-1.09 x J2-1.14 s J3-.818 s GO TO 200 
1"?5 IF F»O"IS0PR0PAN0L" THEN PRINT "ILLEGAL. FUEL " s END 
180 D-.781 N Kl-30.5 N Ui-12.7 
135 Z1-.6 \ Z2-.133 s Z3-.2G7 
190 Jl-1.09 N J2-1.14 S J3-.545 
200 Fl-F*D/60 s F2-INT(Fi*Kl) 
250 REM THIS SETS UP UHICH CHANNNELS ARE READ 
260 CU)-23 \ CC2>-54 \ CC33-53 
270 CC45-S2 s CC53-70 \ CCS)-71 
280 CC75-72 s CC83-73 \ CC9J-6 
285 CC10J-31 \ CC115-32 
290 OPEN "PUPPY" FOR INPUT AS FILE UF2<6000) V N-1000 
300 REM THIS SELECTS AND OPENS EXPT.B99 STORAGE FILES 
310 N-N+l \ N*-STR»(N) s N»-SEG«<N»,2,4) N M»-"DK1t"+P»+"."+N» 
320 OPEN M» FOR INPUT AS FILE UF1 \ 1—60 
30 I-:+76 
340 IF U F K I + D - 1 THEN 1000 
350 IF UFl(I) — 1 THEN CLOSE WF1 N GO ~0 310 
360 IF UFKIXA THEN 330 
3 7 0 IF UF1(I )>B THEN 1000 
5 0 0 REM THIS PULLS DATA OFF THE DISC 
5 1 0 P-UF1CI+CC1 1+1 ) N 0-kJFia-rCC2) + l ) N R»UF1(I+C<3) + 1 ) 
5 3 0 S-UF1CI+CC4)+1) N T - y F l ( I + C ( 5 ) + l ) x U-UF1CI+CC6 ) + l ) 
5 3 0 y -UFlCI+CC7)+l ) \ U - U F i a + C C 8 ) + l ) s Y-UF1CI+C<9)+1) 
5 4 0 Z-VF1(I+CC10)+1> \ Z 0 - U F K I + C U 1 J+ l ) 
600 REM THESE LINES ARE FOR CALIBRATION EQUATIONS 
6 0 5 P«P*1000 \ P — 1 . 6 + 2 5 . 5 4 4 * P - . 0 9 2 3 6 7 * P ^ 2 + 1 . 4 6 6 7 0 E - 0 3 * P ~ 3 
6 0 7 V«V*1000 \ V — 1 . 6 + 2 5 . 5 4 4 * V- .092367*V~2+1.46670E-03*V'>3 
6 1 0 0 - 0 * 1 2 1 6 
6 1 5 R-R*1216 







650 Z-Z*1000 \ Z—1.6+25.544*Z-.092367*ZA2+1.466?0E-03*Z"3 
655 Z0-Z0*1000 \ Z0--•i.6+25.S44*Z0-.09236?*Ze.*2+1.46670E-03*Z0~3 
6 7 5 Z - I N T U Z + Z 0 V 2 ) 
700 REM THIS STORES DATA IN ENG UNITS IN UFILE PUPPV 
7 1 0 X-X+l x IF X-500 THEN 1000 
720 UF2C0J-X \ UF2(X)-P \ UF2<X+500)-Q 
730 UF2(X+1000)-R \ UF2(X+1500)-S \ UF2CX+20005-T 
740 UF2CX+2500J-U s UF2CX+3000J-U N UF2CX+3500)-U 
750 OF2(X+4000)-V s UF2<X+4500)"Z 
800 GO TO 330 
1000 CLOSE s PAGE \ PRINT CHRS(27),CHR»(12) s CHAIN "FANG" 
READV 
FANG ia-NOU-81 NU BASIORT-11 U01-01D 
1 REP1 FANG.B99 URITTEN 1<?--S1 BV KEN FOOTE AS PART OF THE DOG FILES 
2 REd THIS TAKES DATA FROn FIDO AND CHAINS TO ROUER 20 connoN F-. #P* 1000 OPEN "PUPPV" FOR INPUT AS FILE UF1(6000) 
10-40 OPEN "SNOOPV" FOR INPUT AS FILE UF2(15000) 
1060 UF£t0)-UFl(0)-6 N UF2(500)-INT(UFK1500+yFl(0))) 
1100 UF2<1000)-UFl(4501) N UF2(1S00)-F2 
2000 FOR 1-1 TO UF2(0) 
3O00 REN THIS DOES THE MANIPULATION 
3020 ni-(352.8/,(273+UFl(1+4500)) )*<UF1 < 1+5003+UF1C1+1000) )*1.05 
















3400 Ql-1.02000E-03* CVF1 (1+4500 J+273 >*M1 




300 06— (03+04) 
3520 C8-21*Fl+12x44*D3+12-'18)«C3+12/16*H3 
3540 H8-22*Fl+2/18*U3+4/ ' i6*H3 
3560 08-Z3JKF1+03+16/18*U3+3£/44*D3+16/28*C3 
3530 M8-F1+03+D3+C3+H3+U3 
3600 PRINT 1*5; 
3700 REN THIS STORES THE UAUJES IN SNOOPV 
3720 YF2<I)-N1 \ (JF2CI+500 )-N2 \ UF2C1+1000)-M3 
3730 UF2< 1+1500 )-Nl N UF2C 1+2000 )«N2 v UF2CI+2500)-N3 
3740 UF2(1+3000)-01 \ UF2C1+3500)-02 \ UF2C1+4000)-03 
3750 UF2C1+4500 )«U1 \ UF2C1+5000 )-U2 \ UF2(1+5500 )-U3 
3760 UF2C1+6000)-D3 \ VF2C1+6500)-03 N UF2C1+7000)-H3 
3780 UF2<1+7500)-C0 \ UF2C1+8000)-F0 
3790 UF2<1+8500)-C8 v <JF2Cl+9000)-H3 s UF2<1+9500)-M8 s UF2(1+100005-08 
3800 UF2C1+10500)-Ql \ YF2(1+11000)-Q2 \ UF2(1+11500>-Q3 
3820 UF2C1+12000)-04 s VF8C1+12500)-Q5 \ UF2C1+13000)-06 
4000 NEXT I 
5000 CHAIN "ROVER" 
READY 
ROVER 12-N0U-81 MU BASIC/RT-li U01-S1D 
1 REM R0UER.B99 WRITTEN 10/81 BY KEN FOOTE AS PART OF THE DOG FILES 
2 REN TC PLOT DATA FROM FANG.B99 
59 SPD(0) s PAGE v PRINT CHR*<27),CHR*C12) 
10© IF F*<>"" THEN ISO 
110 PRINT "UHAT TEST UAS THIS CEX. CEL8)"; N INPUT P» 
1E0 PRINT "UHAT UAS THE FUEL "; N INPUT F» 
150 PRINT "UHAT IS THE TITLE TO BE"; \ INPUT TS 
160 PRINT "WHICH CURUES DO YOU UANT TO SEE?(2 INPUTS 0-26)"; s INPUT B,C 
165 IF ABSCC-B)>8 THEN PRINT "ILLEGAL RANGE (8 CURUES MAX)" s GO TO 160 
170 Y««"GRAf!S/SEC" N IF B>20 THEN Y»-"KILOWATTS" 
175 PRINT "INPUT THE MAX UALUE OF THE PLOT"; S INPUT Q 
ISO Q2-2*Q \ P-600/Q2 
200 OPEN "SNOOPY" FOR INPUT AS FILE UF4(15000) 
35© REM THIS FINDS THE UALUE OF DT <T3> 
355 T0-0 s T1-UF4(0)*5 
360 T2-T1-T0 s IF T2>48 THEN 370 \ T3-5 N GO TO 380 
370 IF T2>96 THEN 371 \ T3-10 S GO TO 380 
371 IF T2>192 THEN 372 s T3-20 s GO TO 380 
372 IF T2>480 THEN 373 \ T3-50 \ GO TO 380 
373 IF T2>960 THEN 374 \ T3-100 \ GO TO 380 
374 IF T2M920 THEN 375 \ T3-200 s GO TO 380 
375 T3-1000 \ IF T2>4800 THEN 380 s T3-500 
380 T5-0 v REM T4 AND T5 BRACKET TIME IN MULTIPLES OF DT 
385 T5-T5+T3 s IF TSOT0 THEN 385 s T4-T5-T3 
390 IF T5>-Tl THEN 395 v T5-T5+T3 N GO TO 390 
395 T2-T5-T4 
500 PRINT CHR*(27),CHR»(12) s REM PLOTS PERIMETER 
530 PLOT£0,0,0) \ PLOT(0,779,1) \ PLOT(1023,779,1> N PLOT(1023,0,1) 
540 PLOT(0,0,1) \ PLOT(85,650,0) S PLOT(85,S0,1) s PLOT(98S,S0,1) 
550 REM PLOTS UERT 8. H0RI2 GRID 
560 FOR I-T4 TO T5 STEP T3 s X0-SS+(I-T4>*900/T2 
50 TEXTCX0-30,33,1,1,1) v IF I-T4 THEN 590 
580 FOR V0-50 TO 650 STEP 10 s PLOT(X0,V0,0> N NEXT V0 
590 NEXT I 
600 FOR VO-150 TO S50 STEP 100 ^ FOR X0-85 TO 984 STEP 90*T3^TS 
6£0 PLOT(X0,V0,0) s NEXT X0 N NEXT V0 
900 REM PLOTS TITLES 
90S TEXTC480,5,2,1,"SECONDS") N TEXT(25,250,£,0,Y*) 
910 TEXTC50,690,2,1,P») v TEXTC40,740,3,1,T«) 
915 T1«-STR»(UF4C1000))+" C " s TB»-STR»<;YF4C500))+" L'S 
320 T3*-STRSCYF4(1500))+"KU" 
9S5 TEXTC200,700,1,1,Tl*+T2*+T3») \ TEXT(200,675,1,1,F») 
930 TEXTC40,50,1,1,-Q) s TEXTC40,350,1,1,0) \ TEXTC40,650,1,1,Q) 
1000 REM CURUE LABELS 
1005 OPEN "BONES" FOR INPUT AS FILE UF5»<40) 
1010 FOR 1-0 TO C-B \ PLOTC580,767-1*81,0,2,1,1) 
1020 I-I+B v N««UF5<I) S I-I-B \ TEXT(600,760-1*21,1,1,N») 
1050 NEXT I v CLOSE UF5 
1100 REM THIS PLOTS THE DATA 
1120 FOR 1-0 TO C-B N S-S+B0*(I+l)+85 
1140 FOR J-i TO UF4C0) \ X0-85+J*900/'T2*5 
1160 I-I+B N Y0-50+CUF4(J+I*500)+Q)*P \ I-I-B 
1510 IF V0<50 THEN V0-50 
1520 IF V0>650 THEN V0-650 
1530 IF XC0)-0 THEN 1600 
1540 PLOTCXC0),Y<0),0) 
1550 IF X0<S THEN PLOTCX0,V0,1) \ GO TO 1600 
1575 PLOTCX0,V0,1,2,1,I) \ S-X0+90 
1600 X(0)-X0 \ VC0)-V0 
1900 NEXT J 
1950 XC0)-0 s VC05-0 \ S-0 
2000 NEXT I v CLOSE 
3000 PRINT CHR*C27),CHRSC23) \ PRINT CHR»C27).CHR»(12) \ GO TO 150 
READV 
HEULBL ia-NOU-81 PU BHSICVPT-11 U01-01D 
1 REP THIS SETS THE LABELS USED FOR THE DOG FILES 
E REP WRITTEN 7,81 BY KEN FOOTE 
7 PRINT CHR*(S7),CHR»(ia) 
10 OPEN "BONES" FOR INPUT AS FILE VF5SC40) 
15 FOR 1-0 TO 30 \ PRINT I,UF5CI3 \ NEXT I s CLOSE 
20 PRINT "WHICH ONE IS THE FIRST TO BE CHANGED"; N INPUT A 
£5" PRINT "WHICH ONE IS THE LAST TO BE CHANGED") \ INPUT B 
30 IF A-69 THEN 200 
40 PRINT CHR*(37),CHR»(12J 
5© OPEN "BONES" FOR INPUT AS FILE UFS»£40) 
55 FOR I-A TO B 
59 PRINT N PRINT 
60 PRINT "ELEPENT C";I;H) USED TO BE "jUFSCI) 
65 PRINT "NOW ELEMENT C;I;") IS *t S INPUT L« 
75 UF5(I)'"L* 




SPECKLER'S METHOD FOR A TWO-LAYER 
TEMPERATURE PROFILE 
Dr. Ken Speckler has developed a method for forming a two-layer room 
temperature profile from real data. This important accomplishment links and 
compares real data and current fire growth models, via constraining air 
temperature gradients into a hot- and cold-1lyer analcgy if the gradient. 
Given room height (h ), upper layer temperature (T ) and measured 
values of temperature (T(y)) as a function of height, Speckler predicts the 
layer interface height (h,) and the lower-lay^r temperature (T r). The i it 
equations for h. and T. are derived from equations for the conservation of 
1 ii 
mass in the room and the conservation of area under ihe T(y) curve. This last 
condition isn't completely justified, yet it seems reasonable. Specklir's 
full derivation is at the end oi this appendix. Essentially his equations can 
be reduced to: 
T _ T 
h r f T[y) dy T(v) where a = I "' normalized area under the curve " 
•b nr T U T U 
f r T » dy ,. , ., ... T m *> = I Z—^T-. normalized area under the nurve — r ~ J0 h r T(y) T(y) 
C-l 
For our tests, we constructed a thermocouple (TC) rake with 10 TC's 
evenly spaced approximately 45 cm apart starting 20 cm above the floor. The 
room height (h ) was 4.5 meters, thus we were able to assume tr~t each TC 
was in the middle of a region h /n (n = 10) and was a representative 
temperature over its entire region h /n. We then took the value of £ as the 
average of the temperatures (K°) of the rake divided by T . The value of b 
was found similarly by averaging the inverse of the temperatures (K°) and 
Multiplying by T^. 
T was determined by first finding the average temperature (T ) of 
all the rake TC's. The T was taken as the average of all the temperatures 
greater than T . 
These simplp assumptions proved to be adequate when compared to more 
complicated analysis of the data (i.e., full integration of the temperature 
curve to find the true area under the curve T(y) and more subjective 
determination of T ). 
C-2 
Speckler's Derivation 
Prom conservation of the mass in the room 
h 
(1) m = J P A dy 
Jn 
P P 
assuming — — is constant P = — — so. 
hr r 
rearrange 
mR r n r 1 . (3) ST ~ f i(7) d* I 
our equivalent two layer model of this mass equation is 
(4, ""» iii_ + h r - h l 
AP equal " T L Ty 
if the model is good —• = — . so combine 3 and 4 
AP AP equal 
h l h r - h l fr 
(5) — A - -^ * - ' 
"i , h r - n i r i 
T L TU J T(y) d v 0 M 
ru 
multiplying by — — we get 
T u "i . , H I *u 
<6> ?TnT + x - "X • J -ETi^, a y 
hi r T, 
h r - j 0 h r 
C-3 
Define y 1 = y/hr to normalize 
1 
(7) T±H + x - Ok . f JX ay1 r L h r h r J T(y ) 
Rearranging 
1 
T n hi h , 
(8) - 2 t = _ i - ••• + 
u n i = 2i _ i 
X T ( y ' l 
multiplying by 2l we get, 
(9) 
1 
ZM = i - i k + h f ZL ay" 
T L "I "1 / T ( y', 
0 
From the conservation of area under the curve T(y) 
hr 
l T ( y , d y (10) T Lh L + Ty (hr _ h x) 
Dividing by h r T 0 we ge t , 
(11) T L h l + 1 - j j l = I ^(y)dy 
TU h r h r J 0 h rT„ 
Again we define y = y/hr to normalize. 
(i2) T L h i t i - H i _ / " T ( Y ' ) d y 
T U hr h r "J T„ 
"1 Rearranging and multiplying by — we get h r 
T L (13) = — 
1 
hr f T ( v.)dy' hi _ , 
h l J0 TU hr 
C-4 
To simplify let: 
1 T(y)' dy i 
a = f ^ *• - normalized area under the curve T(y ) 
Jo 





f JH dy 
J T(y') 
Thus 13 becomes 
(13a) Y = -i- (a + (X -1)) 
Rearranging 
(13b) Y = (a + X - 1) 
X 
Rearranging 
(13c) Y - (a - 1) + 1 
X 
and 9 becomes, 
( 9 . , - * - - l - - | - • 
_ b 
X 
substituting 13b for y 
' ' (a • X - 11 " ~ + ^ 
X 
Rearranging we get 
(X - 1 + b) (a + X - 1) (15) 1 - - L — " J 
multiplying by X^ we get 
2 
(16) X - (X - 1 + b) (a + X - 1) 
C-5 
multiplying out gives us 
2 2 117) x = X - 2X + aX + bX + ab - a - b + 1 
Regrouping 
2 2 
(18) x = X + X (a - 1) + X ;b - 1) + (a - 1! (b - 1) 
subtraction X to both sides 
(19) 0 = X (a - 1) + X (b - 1) + :.• - 1) (i> 1) 
subtract U-. - U (b - 1) from both ti.ies 
(20) - la - 1) (b - 1) -" x (a - 1) + (b - 1) 
Regrouping ^ive us 
(21) - ia • i) (b - 1) = X (a - 1 + b - 1) 
dividing t/ la - 1 + b - 1) and summing gives us 
r / , , . -(a - 1) (b - 1) 
(a + b - 2) 
Takiny 22 arid substituting X from the definition of X „nc rearranging gi'es 
a + b - 2 
Taking 13c and substituting Y from the delinition of Y and X from 22 gives 
(24) - T i . ' a - 1) V 5 
T„ -(a - 1) (b - 1) 
a + b - 2 
Rearranging gives 
(25) T, = T„ (a - 1) (a 4- b - 2) + x 
-(a - 1) (b - 1) 
(26) \ = T -'a + b - 2) + j_ 
L (b - 1) 
C-6 
LAYER 11-N0U-31 MU BftSIC/RT-11 U61-01D 
1 REM LAYER.B99 URITTFN 11/81 BY KEN FOOTE 
E REM IT TAKES REK DATA AND CALCULATES LAYER HEIGHT AND TEMPS 
50 PRINT "UHAT FILE DO YOU WANT (EX. REK.2)"; s INPUT F* \ Ft-"DK11 "+F» 
60 PRINT "UHAT IS THE FIRST TIME YOU WANT TO SEE"; \ INPUT S0 
70 PRINT "UHAT IS THE LAST TIME YOU WANT TO SEE"; \ INPUT SI 
100 PRINT CHRS(27),CHR»(12) \ OPEN Ff FOR INPUT AS FILE UF1(20000) 
110 IF S1>-UF1C4) THEN S1-UFK4) 
120 FOR J-S0/S*ll+5 TO S1/-5*ll+5 STEP 11 
130 R0-0 \ Rl-0 N R2-C s C-0 N H0-4.5 
140 PRINT UFKJ); 
150 ̂ OR 1-1 TO 10 
160 PRINT UF1CJ+I); \ R0-R0+UFKJ+I) s R1-R1+C l ' ( U F l ( J+I )+273 )) 
170 NEXT I 
200 REn T UPPER IS TAKEN AS THE AUG. OF ALL TEMP ABOUE MEAN 
210 M-RO/10 v Ml-Rl/10 \ PRINT \ PRINT "II -">M, 
220 E«-0 N IF UFKJ+10X40 THEN E-5 
230 FOR I»l TO 10 \ IF UFKJ+IXM+E THEN 250 
240 R2-R2+UFKJ+I) \ C-C+l \ PRINT UF1CJ+I), 
250 NEXT I \ PRINT 
300 IF C-0 THEN H-H0 s T0-UFKJ+10) \ T l - U F K J + l ) \ GO TO 500 
320 T0-R2/ -C+273 
340 REP1 THIS CALCULATES THE AREA AND NORMALIZES I T 
360 A-(M+273)/T0 \ B-M1*T0 
400 REM THIS CALCULATES THE LAYER HEIGHT AND THE LOWER TEMP 
420 X—CA-1 )*<B-1 )/(A+B-2) \ V-CA-D/X+1 
440 Tl-INT(T0*Y-273) s T0-INTCT0-273) s H-INT(H0*X*100)/190 
500 PRINT "T LOUER -";Tlj" T UPPER -";T0; 
510 PRINT " LAYER HEIGHT -",H 
520 PRINT N PRINT \ NEXT J \ CLOSE 
READY 
APPENDIX D 
• Smoke Dilution System 
• Smoke Detector Survey 
D-l 
SMOKE DILUTION SYSTEM 
Contrary to our expectations, the aerosol dilution system descrioed in 
the 2nd and 3rd pugress reports of FY 1981 proved to be nearly useless. 
Consisting of a porous tube concentrically installed in an impervious 
cylinder, aerosol-laden air (Q ) flowing axially through the tube is diluted 
by clean air (0 ) passing radially through the porous tube. Fire dilution 
ratio in the combined flow (0_) is defined by relative radial-to-axial-flow 
rates. CL momentum allegedly forms an air sheath on the inner surfaces that 
prevents particulate contact with the wall, but allows for diffusion of pure 
air into Q as shown schematically in Fig. 1. However, if Q + Q 
becomes turbulent at some distance down the tube, particulate intrudes through 
the surface boundary layer and interacts with the walls, thus changing aerosol 
characteristics. Fig. 2 shows dilution ratios Q versus pressure for five 
sizes of monodispersed aerosols ranging in diameter from 0.364 microns to 3.0 
microns. Obviously dilution effectiveness is aerosol-size dependent which is 
an unacceptable state for analysis. 
The method we plan to try next is shown schematically in Fig. 3. 
Employing flow transducers used at the University of Minnesota, dilution 
would be controlled by the amount of dilution air Q and air pressure to 
drive Q ,. Sample inlet tube would be sized to allow isokinetic sampling in 
the sample stream. The outlet would be open to atmosphere and a sample drawn 
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SURVEY OF COMMERCIAL FIRE DETECTORS 
The following table condenses sta^-of-the-art information about the 
operation and charcteristics of commercially available fire detectors. These 
data were collected from contemporary reports and brochures representing the 
range of international manufacturers of smoke .rid fire detectors. 
The survey shows us that commercial detector fabricators are not actively 
seeking businesr in special markets such as high-energy-research laboratories. 
We will not be able to buy "off-the-shelf" detectors that discriminate between 
smoke aerosols from different burning materials. Thus, our next task will be 
to directly contact the manufacturers, determine the direction of their 
research efforts, and to assess their capability to produce individual 




DETECTOR*. METHOD OF OPERATION 
Infrared conponent o f 
f lane detected by any 
one of several tyDes of 
pho toce l l s . 
SUB1UCR0METER 
PARTICLE CO'lNTIHn 
P a r t i c l e Ion i za t i on 
Condensation Nuclei 
U l t r a v i o l e t f l ane 
conponent detected by 
var ious sensinq elenent 
Mrasurenent n f the 
v a r i a t i o n in e l e c t r i c a l 
charge duo to the 
presence of ion ized 
p a r t i c l e s to de tem ine 
suhnicroneter p a r t i c l * 1 
concen t ra t ion . 
Photoe lec t r ic 
neasurenent of water 
condensation p a r t i c l p s . 
A i r novenents, caused 
qascs f ron a r : v * , 
' i is*( i rhs the s' ,,r.r, 
wave pa t te rn o f an 
u l t rason ic o s c i l l a t y 
and i s Monitored by .in 
u l t rason ic roc f i v e r . 
P h o t o e l e c t r i c / 
I o n i z a t i o n 
Incorporates both 
pho toe lec t r i c and 
i on i za t i on cha--ih«r<, 
s ingle u n i t . 
cmiuusTinn PRODUCT 
BEST DETECTED 
'Jide scanning range, 
respond to sh ie lded 
s igna l s . 
Expensive, require 
na in t inance. Subjec t 
to fa lse a l a m s due to 
shock. Slow response 
f ro i i suo ldenng f i r e s . 
Insens i t i ve to sur or 
. i r t i i c i a l 1 i g h t , wide 
viewing range. 
Flanes and snnke. High s e n s i t i v i t y . Care nust be taken to 
choose proper a l a m 
thresholds to prevent 
fa lse a l a r m . 
Flanes and snoke. Var iable s e n s i t i v i t i e s 
f o r various c o n d i t i o n s . 
Hut gases. F a i r l y la rge area can Can only be used when 
be non i tu rcd . pro tec ted prenises arc 
unoccupied. 
Both open f lane 
and snoke f i r e s . 
The advantages 
present i n j i n g l e 
- stage pho toe lec t r i c 
and i o n i z a t i o n 
detectors are present 
i n the ennb inat ion 
u n i t s . 
More expensive than 
s ing le u n i t s . Require 
sono .ia intend nee. 
Must be used i n 
clean area. 
NJ' I :V:O ! JAL 
OETECTOtlS MrTHOn W OPERATION 
COMB'JSTION p[*10i;Cr 
BEST DEIECTES 
Obscuration (lean j f l i g h t 
e^erqy pro jected 
across protected 
area to photosefisinq 
rece ive r , snoke 
present cuts down 
on 1 ight present, 
s e t t i n g o f f a l a m . 
Scat te r ing Photoser.si ng device 
placed out of 1 i q h t 
bearo pa th , snoke 
p a r t i c l e s present 
sca t te r the Tight 
causing contact w i t h 
photoscnsing device 
se t t i ng o f f a l a m . 
L i g h t AtLenuation Bean of l i g h t 
pro jected to 
rece ive r , ( pho toce l1 / 
re lay a s s e n b l y l , i s 
reduced by snoke. 
Response wi th la rqp 
decrease in resi 5-
tance when exposed 
to reducing or 
conhust ib le ga?es. 
Apr iso l anfl Tases 
produced dur inq f i r e s . 
Resistance Bridge 
L^ss expensive than 
i o n i z a t i o n types. not 
suhject to f a l se 
a lants f ron hun id i t v 
and shock. Good 
response to snp lder inq 
f i res. lionfi r e l iab i 1 -
i ty i f mainta ined. 
Reset t ing type. 
Good f o r p r o t e c t i o n 
o f large open areas. 
RADIANT ENERGY 
Decrease of res is tance 
on high resistance 
g r i d due to adsorpt ion 
o f aerosol and gaseous 
products , se t t i ng o f f 
a l a m . 
Response to i n f r a r e d 
or u l t r a v i o l e t bands. 
^educing o r conhust ib l i-
gases, hydrogen, carbon 
nonoairte, methane, 
propane, a l coho l , 
v o l a t i l e o i l and 
acety lene. 
Gast-s and aerosols . Able to compensate 
f o r slo'J changes in 
ambient condi t i o n s . 
Smoldering o r f laming 
combustion. 
Fast response, 
good r e l i a b i l i t y -
Possible ra ise a l a r m 
flue to Oust or powders-
Slow response to clean 
f i r e s . 
More expensive than 
heat de tec to rs . Slow 
response to c lean 
f i r e . Maintenance 
requ i red . 
Slow response due 
to length o f l i g h t 
path. Exposure to 
l i g h t can danange 
pho toce l l s . 
contamination o f 
sensor. False 
alan.is due to bug 
spray, c lean ing 
f l u i d s and o ther 
comonly used ' t ens . 
D i f f i c u l t y w i t h f a l se 
a lan is f r on moisture 
ano a i rborne 
contan inants . 
Re la t i ve l y expensive. 
RATE OF RISE 
METHOD OF OPERATION 
COMBUSTION PRODUCT 
BEST DETECTED 
Expansion of qases Convected thenid l 
w i t h i n closed systen energy evolved during 
generates nechanical conhust ion. 
forces setting off 
j la rn. 
Fai rly inexpensive, 
^oth continuous line 
and spot type 
available. Self 
restoring. 
False alams due to 
stean leaks, unvented 
coubustion heaters and 
forced air heating 
units. 
Thermoelectric 
AEROSOL AND GAS 
Voltage generat ion 
between thermocouples 
a t d i f f e r e n t tenper-
atures and va r i a t i ons 
in rate of res is tance 
change wi th tenperature. 
Not subject to f a l s e 
a l a m s , good 
r e l i a b i l i t y , l i t t l e 
Maintenance requ i red. 
Radioactive n a t e n a l Good f o r detect ing 
i n the sensing chanber f i r e s w i t h an open 
Photoe lec t r i c 
es o f f a n inu te 
e l e c t r i c a l c u r r e n t . 
Snoko p a r t i c l e s upon 
enter ing the chanber 
1ower the cur ren t 
which i s sensed by 
the c i r c u i t r y sounding 
the a l a m . 
Aerosols generated 
during f i r e a f f e c t 
the propagation of 
l i g h t passing through 
the detector . 
f lane and l i t t l e 
v i s i b l e snoke 
present. 
Snnke p a r t i c l e s 
present dur ing 
COiibustion 
Highly sens i t i ve , low 
e l e c t r i c a l s t ress 
resu l t i ng in low 
nainta inance, 
rad ioact ive source, 
vri th long ha l f - 1 i f e , 
never needs rep lac ing . 
F a i r l y naintenance 
f ree ,ba t te ry p e r i o d i ­
c a l l y replaced, and 
less occasional ly the 
LED used as the 1 ight 
source detector . 
Easi ly foo led subject to 
fa lse alan.is froi.i 
hun id i t y , shock and a i r 
ve l oc i t y . 
Slow response to hot 
clean f l ane - Must be 
nainta inod and i n s t a l l e d 
in clean atnosphere to 
prevent possib le false 
a lan is . 
INDIVIDUAL 
DETECTORS METHOD QF OPERATION 
COMVECTEI) ENERGY Response to theme 1 
energy generated in 
Fixed Tenperature 




operat ing element 
reaches preset 
lenperature. 
Act ivates a l a m 
when i.ietal used 
reaches i t s n e l t i n g 
po in t . 
Bulb hreaks due to 
pressure increase 
causing contacts to 
c lose . 
Themoplast ic 
i nsu la to r n e l t s , 
a l lowing two s tee l 
wires to make 
contact , s e t t i n g o f f 
a l a m . 
D i f f e ren t c o e f f i ­
c ients of expansions 
o f two ne ta ls 
cause s t ress , se t ­
t i ng i f f a l a m . 
Operates when 
tenperature change 





A l l o f the fo l low ing 
dre designed to respond 
to the convected 
t hema l energy evolved 
dur ing conbust ion. 
High r e l i a b i l i t y , 
low naintenance, and 
freedon f ran fa l se 
a l a m s . 
Generally the l e a s t 
expensive type 
detec tors . 
Slow response to 
smoldering or slow 
burning f i r e s . 
Good r e l i a b i l i t .y , 
good freedom f i 'on 
fa lse a l a m s . 
Must be replaced a f te • 
a c t i v a t i o n . 
L i t t l e maintenance, 
tenperature o f 
a c t i v a t i o n c o n t r o l ­
l a b l e . 
Bulb nust be replaced. 
Some types can be 
used to determine 
loca t i on o f f i r e , 
easy i n s t a l l a t i o n . 
Fused sect ion oust be 
replaced eacn t i n e . 
Autonatic r es to ra t i on Lack of rapid pos i t i ve 
when temperature drops ac t i on , prone to f a l se 
below operat ion po in t , a lams due to 
v i b r a t i o n . 
Convected themal 
energy. 
Compensates f o r 
non- f i re ambient 
temperature changes. 
Faster reac t ing 
than f i x e d 
temperature types. 
Not fas t responding to 
smoldering o r slow 
burning f i r e s -
INDIVIDUAL 
DETECTORS 
l a t e o f R ise/ 
Fixed Tenperature 
Resistance Br idge/ 
Ion Chanber 
U l t r a v i o l e t / 
I n f ra red 
tIETHnn OF OPERATION 
C0HBUSTIOH PRODUCT 
BEST DETECTED DRAWL'ACK S 
Heat evolved during 
conbustion. 
Rate of rise function 
is usually a vented 
henispherical air 
chanber and a flexible 
diaphragn. Fixed 
tenperature elenent is 
either a hinetal str ip 
of leaf spring 
restrained by eutective 
netal. 
Each detection element Gases, aerosols and 
has i t s own bridge 
c i rcui t which 
triggers one 
electronic gate. 
When a f i re signal 
is present fron both 
gates the detector 
sound the alam. 
A predetermined 
deviation froi.i the 
prescribed anbient 
set off alam. 
open flane f i res. 
Flaning f i res. 
Quick response to 
rapidly developing 
f ires by rate of 
rise and response 
to slow developing 
smoldering fires 
by fixed tenperature. 
Sensitive yet not 
overly prone to false 
alams i f care is 
taken with proper 
placement of units. 
'Jirie scanning range, 
response to a 
shielded signal. 
More expensive than 
single units. Response 
tine to slow burning or 
snoldering f ires slower 
than rapid developing 
f ires. 
False alams due to 
cor.non itens such as 
cooking, dust, powder 
and aerosol sprays. 
Prone to false alam 
signals when used 
near flashing lights 
or lights with UV 
radiation. 
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